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This thesis will look at the capability development of USAF BP/BPC units using current 
programs such as the 6th Special Operations Squadron, and detailed case studies of Farm 
Gate and the current Mobility Support Advisory Squadron. The focus is on both success 
and where the USAF falls short when developing BP/BPC capability. The thesis follows 
the planning process and initial assumptions of both Farm Gate and the MSAS with a 
breakdown of the two major planning oversights. First, the study will examine the lack of 
funding authority as a problem that needs correction at a Headquarters Air Force and 
legislative level by creating a globally applicable authority for building partnership. 
Second, the study will focus on problems with Command Authorities, specifically the 
unwillingness of AMC to transfer authority to the GCC. Finally, potential solutions and 
recommendations on all levels are proposed, from the unit to national-level policy. The 
paper reveals shortfalls in the planning process, but it also shows the extraordinary efforts 
of the Airmen involved in the squadrons. From Farm Gate to the MSAS, the ultimate 
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The United States Air Force (USAF) is uniquely equipped to assist developing 
partner nations improve their aviation enterprise. The benefits of assisting and advising 
partners are twofold. First, the U.S. increases the capacity of that partner to deal with 
crises without U.S. assistance. Second, working with the partner nation deepens 
relationships, and access for U.S. forces becomes easier in the future. For the USAF, 
access is important; runways and land from which to operate has enabled direct action 
around the world for decades. Historically, when the Air Force sees a need to increase 
their capabilities in this realm leadership perceives an urgent need for the capability and 
pushes development from the top down. Because of this urgent push from the top, the 
USAF develops units dedicated to the mission quickly. What problems does that rapid 
capability development cause?  This thesis will examine the fielding of USAF units 
dedicated to Building Partnership and Building Partner Capacity (BP/BPC), focusing on 
the way in which the units were developed, as well as assumptions made, both stated and 
unstated, ultimately revealing the two key failures of those assumptions and the effect the 
planning failures had on the U.S. Air Force’s Building Partnership and Building Partner 
Capacity mission. 
The most recent example of this capability development occurred in Air Mobility 
Command (AMC). In just over two years, the United States Air Force and AMC created 
two complete squadrons dedicated to the Building Partnership/ Building Partner Capacity 
mission.1  This is incredibly fast by today’s standards, and the speed reflects a confluence 
of global imperatives, intra- and inter-service power politics, and a historic ability of the 
USAF to create capability on demand. This development reflects a change in Department 
of Defense (DoD) policy on the Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission. Already seen 
in the Army and Marine Corps, the USAF is moving SFA to the General Purpose Force  
 
                                                 
1 The USAF IW Tiger Team conducted its work in April 2009. The 571 MSAS stood up in May 2011.  
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(GPF).2  Developing this capability in the GPF exposes an entirely new group of planners 
to the problems associated with BP/BPC and highlights the issues that arise when 
developing BP/BPC units.  
In order to explore the problems often encountered by the Air Force when 
developing building partnership and building partner capacity capabilities, this thesis will 
first explain the BP/BPC mission, and then look at the current state of USAF SFA 
activity. Next, a historical case study from Vietnam and one of the first USAF SFA units, 
Farm Gate, will show that these problems are not new. Finally, the thesis will examine 
the evolution of the Mobility Support Advisory Squadron (MSAS) concept and current 
structure of the squadron. Once the basics and background are clear, the thesis briefly 
examines the twelve stated assumptions from AMC’s 2010 Concept of Employment 
(CONEMP) for the MSAS one at a time and judges them based on their validity in 2013. 
Finally, this work examines the two critical unstated assumptions concerning funding and 
Command Authority, comparing them to the reality of 2013. Only by looking at each of 
these assumptions, can one gain perspective on the relative success or failure of the Air 
Force BP/BPC capability. The USAF, when developing on the ground capabilities such 
as Farm Gate, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), and the MSAS, tends to 
overlook funding requirements and potential associated restrictions, as well as 
ascertaining essential Command Authorities.  This abdication of responsibility required 
the initial cadre of Airmen in the squadrons, acting at the tactical-level, to solve these 
national-level challenges as they stand up the squadrons. This is a failure of the USAF 
planning process, and results from a rush to field the capability, the complexity of both 
the Department of Defense and legislative process, and the inability of the DoD to 
articulate successfully a need for a global funding authority for Security Force Assistance 
in the General Purpose Force.  
                                                 
2 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Building the Capacity of Partner States 
Through Security Force Assistance, by Thomas K. Livingston, CRS Report R41817 (Washington DC, 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 5 May, 2011), 34. 
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A. IMPORTANCE 
The Building Partner Capacity mission is a hot topic in the world of defense 
today. The concept is not a new one. The United States has been conducting similar 
missions throughout history. This effort increased in the Cold War, as the United States 
trained and equipped many foreign militaries in attempts to either stabilize a region or 
curry favor with allies and partners. More recently, with declining defense budgets, the 
strategic guidance for the Department of Defense includes specific language referring to 
BPC.  
Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, 
pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations…including 
those in Africa and Latin America …whose interests and viewpoints are 
merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. 
Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-
footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on 
exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.3  
The Air Force’s MSAS concept reflects emphasis on Africa and Latin America. 
With one squadron on the West Coast dedicated to support in Latin America, and another 
on the East Coast supporting Africa, it appears as though the Air Force has perfectly 
reflected the intent of the strategic guidance. What is unclear is how the USAF got here, 
which assumptions the leaders made concerning funding and Command Authorities, how 
the Airmen executing the mission will fund engagements long term, and who will 
ultimately control and be accountable for the teams in the field as they move from 
preparation to execution. Until recently, the training and advisory role has been confined 
to Special Operations and Air Education and Training Command. The funding streams 
for these operations originate from both Title 10 and Title 22; they are established and 
well known. As AMC took on the role and developed a new capability, there was no 
known authority for funding their operations. In addition, Lt. Col. Thomas Adkins, 
Commander of the 818 MSAS indicated in an interview with the author that with AMC is 
somewhat unwilling to relinquish operational control to the Geographic Combatant 
Commander, the Command Authority becomes confused and makes alignment of efforts 
                                                 
3 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21
st
 Century Defense  
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary Of Defense, January 2012), 3. 
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with the theater security plan more difficult. These problems are not unique to the MSAS; 
the Air Force experienced them each time it developed a new SFA squadron. A better 
understanding of the planners’ assumptions, both stated and unstated, which led to the 
development of the capability in its current form, combined with the historical precedent 
of SFA capability development, will better help determine if the method by which the Air 
Force fields Security Assistance forces is creating effective units, and what factors are 
commonly overlooked. This research is both descriptive and prescriptive. Not only will 
the conclusions provide recommended changes at many levels, but also examines the 
capability development process and shows how early designation of funding and 
designation of appropriate Command Authority can ease the work-load of initial cadre 
and create more effective units. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
Discussion of U.S. efforts to aid other nations with their security efforts 
introduces an entirely new lexicon. To confuse matters, there is no authoritative source to 
define these terms, and those who discuss the subject often misuse the terms. In order to 
clarify some of the verbiage used herein, some specification of terminology is needed. 
This section will first discuss common terms in U.S. efforts to aid foreign nations. In 
addition, a short discussion of both funding authority and Command Authorities will help 
the reader better understand the remainder of this thesis.  
The United States classifies most of its efforts to aid foreign nations in their 
security efforts as Security Cooperation (SC). When discussing the nation the U.S. is 
dealing with, professionals often use the term Partner Nation (PN). Partner Nation is a 
blanket term used to describe any nation the United States is working with in a Security 
Cooperation environment. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) describes 
Security Cooperation in three ways on their website. First, the U.S. builds relationships 
that promote specified U.S. interests. Next, they are built to increase allied/friendly 
nations’ capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations. Finally, they provide U.S. 
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forces with peacetime and contingency access.4  One sub-category of SC that applies to 
this thesis is Security Assistance (SA) or Security Force Assistance. According to Joint 
Publication 32, SFA is, “DoD’s contribution to a unified action effort to support and 
augment the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and 
their supporting institutions to facilitate the achievement of specific objectives shared by 
the U.S. Government (USG).”5  It then goes on to distinguish that the DoD assists those 
foreign security forces engaged in national defense, while other USG agencies help other 
ministries like interior and justice.6  DSCA’s website describes Security Assistance as, “a 
group of programs authorized by law, to provide defense articles and services in support 
of national policies and objectives.”7  Some examples of this are: International Military 
Education (IMET), where foreign national security professionals are educated in the 
United States; Foreign Military Sales (FMS), where the United States sells items to a 
foreign nation; Foreign Military Financing, “financing through grants or loans the 
acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training;” and most important to this 
work, training, where PN security personnel are trained by U.S. forces.8 This training has 
traditionally been accomplished via the special operations forces under a program called 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Today however, based on experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the United States is attempting to move some of that training mission to the 
General Purpose Force, which is simply the term that refers to the non-special operators.  
When the General Purpose Force conducts SFA missions, they usually fall under 
one of two categories. Building Partnerships and Building Partner Capacity are closely 
related but very distinct missions. According to the Joint Staff, J-5, Building Partnerships 
is, “The ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor or adversary 
                                                 
4 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Frequently Asked Questions,” (n.d.) 
http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/faq.htm, under “What is Security Cooperation.” 
5 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Operations: Joint Pub 3–0 (Washington, DC 10 
September, 2001), V-15. 
6 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Frequently Asked Questions,” (n.d.), 
http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/faq.htm,   under “What is Security Cooperation.” 
7 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Frequently Asked Questions,” (n.d.), 
http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/faq.htm,   under “What is Security Assistance.” 
8 Ibid. 
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leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information 
and conducting activities to influence their perception, will, behavior, and capabilities.”9  
In essence, it is learning to cooperate with a Partner Nation. Building Partner Capacity, is 
slightly different, and is described in a policy memorandum by the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense as, “The ability to assist domestic and foreign partners and 
institutions with the development of their capabilities for mutual benefit and address U.S. 
national or shared global security interests.”10  This definition is derived from the Tier III 
Joint Capability Area (JCA) of “building the capabilities and capacities of partners and 
institutions.”11  In the BP realm, the U.S. is actually looking to increase the capability of 
a partner nation. It is easy to see the connection between the two missions; when 
engaging in BPC, Building Partnership comes naturally.  
When funding BP/BPC missions, there is another lexicon with which one must be 
familiar. The basis of this lexicon is the term funding authority. Funding authority 
designates what regulation, U.S. Code, or portion of the budget designates dollars for a 
program. Specific laws or U.S. Code authorizes most programs, and another committee 
then appropriates funds for that program. These laws establish the program’s defined 
purpose. Along with that defined purpose, the program must have a manager, reporting 
requirements, and associated activities. Activities are devices used by a specific program 
and are controlled by program managers with input from partner nations. Examples of 
activities are exercises, courses, workshops, and even transfer of hardware. Achievement 
of program goals must guide the activities. Some programs are authorized specifically 
and some fall under the umbrella of initiatives. Initiatives fund a collection of programs 
that all aid a set of related goals. An example of this is the Global Peace Operations 
Initiative, designed by the Bush administration, and renewed under President Obama to 
                                                 
9 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, Joint Capability Areas: JCA 2010 Refinement (Washington, DC: 8 
April, 2011). 
10 Michael Donley and Norton Schwartz, 2011 U.S. Air Force Global Partnership Strategy 
(Washington, DC: HQ USAF, 2011), 38.  
11 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, Joint Capability Areas: JCA 2010 Refinement (Washington, DC: 8 
April, 2011). 
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train foreign nations to execute peacekeeping missions.12  Various programs under this 
initiative have funded multiple training centers, transportation and logistics, and other 
exchanges. 
In the case of the military, Title 10 authorizes most programs and activities. This 
section of the U.S. Code, written in 1956 and updated in 1986, designates the roles, 
missions, and organization of the armed forces. If the program or activity involves 
training or equipping U.S. military units Title 10 funds are typically used. Some Building 
Partnership missions still fall under this Title. An example is the Warsaw Initiative Fund, 
which is specifically designed with certain restrictions such as no purchase of equipment, 
to meet the constraints of Title 10.13  For most Security Cooperation activities, the goal is 
not to train and equip the U.S. forces, it is to train with the Partner Nation, thus increasing 
interoperability; in order to accomplish an activity targeted at the PN, Title 22 funds must 
be used. Title 22 generally relates to the State Department, and is titled, “Foreign 
Relations and Intercourse.”  The DoD may also use Title 22 funds when assisting or 
advising foreign military and there are many established avenues for this use.14  
Congress does not write some programs into law, but they are the result of 
commander’s prerogative to utilize some of the DoD’s funds towards a certain goal. 
These types of programs, such as exercises funded by the Joint Staff, must still comply 
with the restrictions of Title 10 and Title 22. In addition, funds that are available for these 
programs and specific activities are limited so they must be well targeted towards an 
overall strategy. This targeting is generally the responsibility of the combatant 
commanders (COCOMs) and usually flows directly from country specific, regional, or 
global strategic guidance. DoD sources, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 
Guidance for Employment of the Force and Combatant Command Theater Campaign 
Plans (TCPs), are written to guide and support these objectives and serve as a reference 
                                                 
12 Department of State, “Global Peace Operations Initiative: State-DoD Partnership,” (n.d.), 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/c47008.htm.  
13 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Warsaw Initiative Fund,” (n.d), 
http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/faq.htm.  
14 U.S. Congress, “Title 22 of the U.S. Code,” (Washington DC, 2011), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collectionUScode.action?collectionCode=USCODE, under “Title 22.”   
 8 
for any planner. They also define Command Authorities within the regional commands 
for the execution of those plans. As the thesis continues to the sections related to 
problems and hypotheses, it is important to keep in mind that the strategic guidance is 
written to focus the TCP, and in turn the programs and activities, on the Geographic 
Combatant Commanders (GCCs) who execute command and control of most forces 
within their Area of Responsibility (AOR).  
The GCC’s only control some of the forces within their AOR, and herein lies 
some of the problems discussed later in this work. Air Mobility Command is particularly 
used to treating their aircraft as “national assets.”  Under this model, the Tanker Airlift 
Control Center (TACC) at Scott AFB, Illinois prioritizes the missions based on a global 
need rather than regional interests.15  This model makes sense for low density, high 
demand aircraft such as tankers, and aircraft that move cargo between theaters like C-17s. 
Not only do these aircraft often traverse multiple AORs in a single day, they are equally 
useful in Central Command (CENTCOM) or Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). These 
AMC assets traditionally report directly to the TACC. Here AMC plans and controls the 
movements of over 100,000 sorties annually.16  By law, United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) has Combatant Command (COCOM) of Air Mobility 
assets. It is illegal for the combatant commander to transfer COCOM, which is the 
authority of a combatant commander to, “organize and employ, assign tasks, designate 
objectives, and give authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint 
training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.”17  
Both Tactical Control (TACON) and Operational Control (OPCON) of these assets are 
executed directly through the TACC and the 18th Air Force at Scott. Operational Control 
includes the authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces. 
TACON is less than OPCON; TACON gives authority to move within an assigned 
                                                 
15 Randy Kee, “Bridging the Gulf Between Theater and Strategic Air Mobility,” (master’s thesis, 
Advanced Study of Air Mobility),  
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/research/bridge/chp2.html  under “chapter 3.” 
16 U.S. Air Mobility Command, “Tanker Airlift Control Center: Factsheet,” (n.d.), 
http://www.618tacc.amc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=13564.  
17 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Operations: Joint Pub 1 (Washington DC 2 May, 
2007), XV. 
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theater in order to accomplish the mission.18  For AMC, the assigned theater is the globe. 
It is important to understand these terms when discussing the issues associated with 
developing a capability focused on security assistance.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The problems associated with the Building Partnership mission are numerous. 
Dealing with foreign nations, confusing funding authorities, shifting national security 
policy, and Command Authorities crossing not only geographic regions, but also federal 
departments, makes planning and executing a BPC mission confusing at best. In looking 
at these problems, two become primary; determining proper funding authority and proper 
Command Authority are critical for legal execution of this important mission. Through 
interviews and personal discussions with members of the MSAS, leadership in the 6th 
SOS, and Senate staffers, it is clear that when the Air Force develops squadrons for 
BP/BPC missions, the funding and Command Authority issues are often left to the men 
and women in the squadron to solve as they move from formation to operations.  
With each change in the Security Force Assistance mission, the funding authority 
issue has posed a challenge. By 2010, funding BPC had been an established process; the 
Special Operations Components and Air Education Command handled BPC in the past. 
Dr. Wray Johnson, a retired Air Force officer and one of the founding members of the 6
th
 
Special Operations Squadron, shared in an interview with the author on December 12, 
2012 that after a stumbling start, the men of the 6th SOS worked with Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) and found funding. They secured dedicated funding streams to 
execute their mission from both Title 22 and Title 10. In 2010, the Air Force, as one of 
the first services to integrate BPC into the General Purpose Force again moved quickly 
through the planning process and made many general statements and large assumptions 
about funding. While the initial concept of employment for the MSAS had many details 
about staffing and timelines for development, the section about funding was very short on 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
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details and stated that funding BPC was “complex.”19  In a personal e-mail with a subject 
matter expert, Mr. G. Hale Laughlin, Mr. Laughlin shared that securing funding for this 
new capability should have been one of the first steps, but while the Air Force provided 
an incredible capability, or supply, they failed properly to influence or account for the 
demand side of the equation. As the unit approached full operational capability, there was 
still confusion as to how they will legally execute.20  This is a problem for the men and 
women of the unit as well as the Air Force, whose leadership rushed to create a high 
demand capability without securing a means to fund that unit’s operations.  
The same rush to field the squadrons that created funding issues also created 
issues of Command Authorities. Again, confusing Command Authorities is a trend for the 
USAF dating back to Vietnam. The men and women of Farm Gate provide a perfect 
example of when the USAF develops a SFA capability without clearly defining 
Command Authorities.21  Dr. Johnson shared in his interview that many of the same 
issues were faced by the men of the 6th SOS. These issues are evident again in the 
MSAS. While early CONEMPs dictated that the MSAS units would Change Operational 
control (CHOP) to the Geographic Combatant Commander when in execution, the most 
recent CONEMP states that the 18th Air Force, AMC’s Numbered Air Force (NAF), will 
retain Operational Control.22  The reasons for this change are not immediately apparent 
and pose problems on multiple levels. First, the lack of transfer of authority (TOA) 
prevents the GCC from fully controlling assets who are implementing the Theater 
Campaign Plan. Second, the lack of control ties back to the funding issue when 
stakeholders raise questions about funding the engagements. Finally, having multiple 
organizations involved creates problems planning for these engagements and 
coordination with other agencies involved in executing the TCP.  
                                                 
19 U. S. Air Mobility Command, Air Mobility System: Building Partnerships Concept of Employment: 
2010 (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, 2010), 14. 
20 Omar Ojeda, “Bullet Background Paper on Funding Challenges of Mobility Support Advisory 
Squadron Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Engagements in SOUTHCOM AOR,” (AFSOUTH/JA: 
Davis Monthan AFB, NM, 2012). 
21 E. B. Westermann, “Relegated to the Backseat,” in Military Advising and Assistance, ed. Donald 
Stoker (New York: Routledge, 2008), 127-151. 
22 U. S. Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 14; U. S. Air Mobility Command, 
Concept of Employment: 2010, 9. 
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The Air Force accomplished a great deal in a small amount of time. In the 2010 
CONEMP, the authors stated assumptions about the growth of Irregular Warfare and the 
presence of mobility forces in those Security Force Assistance activities.23  Left unstated 
were the largest assumptions. The Air Force assumed someone could find a funding 
source. In addition, the Air Force made the large assumption that AMC would be willing 
to CHOP units to the GCCs and that the GCCs would be willing to request and fund the 
engagements. These assumptions proved false until immediately before the MSAS units 
became operational, and left potential legal issues for the two squadrons executing the 
mission. In addition, the assumptions expose a weakness in the Air Force system. The Air 
Force developed a capability without proper budget or Command Authority 
consideration, and while the Air Force successfully created what appears to be an 
effective tool for building partner capacity, what the leadership failed to address is the 
demand side of the equation. Because the command authority lies with AMC, there is 
little accountability or engagement by the GCC; this limits demand. More focus on 
strategic communications and bringing in industry, partner nations, and other 
stakeholders such as Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress is required 
as soon as possible. The GCCs must demand the units, and the leadership in Washington 
must press Congress and the executive to utilize the 1207 funding authority properly 
and/or create new authorities to fund the MSAS and other GPF units like it. Until the 
funding authority for execution is determined, institutionalized, and streamlined, the units 
risk conflicting with Title 10 and Title 22 in an attempt to build partnership. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on this topic is thin. The reason for this dearth of knowledge is 
clear; Building Partnerships and Building Partner Capacity only became terms six years 
ago. While there is some history and scholarly work done on past iterations and the 
development of irregular warfare, the scholarly work on the most recent developments in 
the Air Force and the regularization of BPC is limited to some DoD publications, RAND 
                                                 
23 U. S. Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 14. 
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reports, and other theses. The literature review will break the body of work into three 
segments, historical work, RAND reports/DoD analysis, and other theses or dissertations.  
 In order to show the history of the air advisor mission, the thesis will look at the 
case of Farm Gate in Vietnam, where the confused Command Authority and questionable 
linkage to foreign policy shows the long history the Air Force has in this arena. 
Secondary sources available include “Relegated to the Backseat,” an article in Donald 
Stoker’s book, Military Advising and Assistance. The article details the Farm Gate 
experience from conception to execution, focusing on what the institution did right and 
wrong that led to the unit’s relative ineffectiveness at training their South Vietnamese 
students. Written by E. B. Westermann, “Relegated to the Backseat” does a great job 
showing the confusion in the minds of the individuals as to where the true authority lay. 
The issues are relevant because it shows the interaction amongst the Ambassador, the 
regional commander, and the command structure in Washington. The work does a great 
job integrating the official Air Force history, as well as interviews with men involved in 
the mission including General Cutis LeMay and Colonel Benjamin King, the unit 
commander.24  Our GPF forces executing BPC missions today feel the same tension that 
King and his men felt. In addition to the article examining the Farm Gate unit, John M. 
Newman’s book, JFK and Vietnam takes a closer look at the foreign policy aspect of the 
confusion on the ground in Vietnam and provides a window in to how the men and 
women in-country are often victims of national policy decisions and confusion at the 
highest level. This book looks at the dynamics of the White House and how the 
conception of the advisory mission on a national level. At the Air Force level, the official 
history of the Air Force, written by Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in 
Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965, provides insight to the organizational factors 
that led to the development of Farm Gate.25  While the official histories of the Air Force 
are written to various standards depending on the author, it is fortunate that his particular 
history is extremely detailed, not only offering facts, but often providing insight as to the 
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25 Robert Futrell, The Advisory Years to 1965 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1981), 
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thinking of the individuals and analysis of the issues. The space dedicated to the Farm 
Gate unit and the associated issues is quite extensive, 20–30 pages, and is well written 
and researched.26   
Finally, oral interviews of military leaders, military documents, foreign policy 
documents, and public statements by political leaders will provide the primary source 
grounding. The resources available for study are plentiful, as there are plenty of 
references for Foreign Policy in this period, most of which are available in digital form 
via the national security archive or the state department websites. In addition, the official 
Air Force histories and many personal interviews available from the Air Force history 
office provide insight. The various opinions and conflicting messages found in these 
resources paint a clear picture of disagreement between the civilian masters and military 
leadership compounded by a confused chain of command. Dr. Wray Johnson finds 
similar confusion in the formation of the 6th SOS, his article; “Whither Foreign Internal 
Defense?” provides some insight into those troubles. The article’s focus is not on the 
problems with planning, but it does tangentially address some of the issues.27  
Augmented by an email exchange with Dr. Johnson, the insight provided by the 6th SOS 
and its development proved invaluable. The initial confusion about funding and to a 
lesser extent Command Authority affected the men on the ground, and bore a striking 
resemblance to today’s BPC missions.  
The next segment of literature is Rand reports and other official studies. While 
most of the Rand literature does not focus directly on the topic at hand, it does paint a 
picture of Air Force priorities. One must remember that while Rand is a separate 
Federally Funded Research and Development Center, the Air Force, through Project Air 
Force, gives Rand specific requirements in order to conduct research and analysis on their 
behalf. In the first report on the topic, Courses of Action for Enhancing U.S. Air Force 
“Irregular Warfare” Capabilities, the research team states that it was the result of a 
“quick-turn” request from the USAF for a study to assist U.S. Air Force leadership in 
choosing ways to enhance Air Force capabilities and capacities for irregular warfare 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Wray Johnson, “Whither Foreign Internal Defense,” Airpower Journal (Spring 1997), 83.  
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(IW).28  This report, along with all the Rand reports is well researched and well written. 
Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries is another Rand 
study, which is useful for the perspective it gives on operations conducted by other 
nations. This study looks at Australia, France, and the United Kingdom. There is 
consideration given to the Command Authorities as well as funding in these cases, and 
while not directly applicable to the research question, the problems and solutions in other 
countries certainly inform the discussion. In fact, one of the key questions that the study 
seeks to answer is, “What resources—funding, manpower, and equipment—does the ally 
employ for this mission?”29  The importance of funding is not lost on the Rand 
researchers. The next in a seemingly endless supply of Rand studies is, International 
Cooperation with Partner Air Forces. In this study Rand does a good job of explaining 
the process and the role of the USAF in security cooperation. This document provides a 
great foundation for the process as it stands today and will inform the background section 
of the thesis. The terminology is not complex and the issues are broken down from macro 
to micro, with case studies. The weakness of this report as it relates to this study is the 
lack of a GPF case. The reason is clear; Rand produced the report in 2009, before the 
move of Security cooperation to the GPF.30  The final Rand Study examined thus far is, 
Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force Planning. 
As indicated by the title, this work focuses on planning various security cooperation 
programs and carries the report through the assessment phase. It follows with a “vignette” 
that covers various aspects of security cooperation. There is a large hole in both the work 
and the vignette. Published in 2011, there is no mention of GPF aviation advisors except 
in the abbreviations section. In addition, the term “mobility” is only used two times in the 
entire document. This oversight implies that Rand did not consider the “full range” of 
                                                 
28 Richard Mesic, David E. Thaler, David Ochmanek and Leon Goodson, Courses of Action for 
Enhancing U.S. Air Force “Irregular Warfare” Capabilities: A Functional Solutions Analysis (Santa 
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activities when writing this study.31  Does that oversight reflect an attitude at Rand?  
After looking at the studies written by Rand, as directed by the AF, it appears that the 
mobility role in GPF security cooperation is not high on the list of Air Force priorities. 
The challenges faced by the units reflect this lack of focus. 
The second part of defense department related studies is books on the subject. 
There are two primary works. First, Skin in the Game is a book that has made it into 
many curricula and paints a very negative picture of the national security apparatus as an 
effective tool for security cooperation. The author, General Jeffery Marshall recommends 
wholesale changes to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, allowing it to coordinate 
efforts across departments and merge various funding authorities to gain efficiencies. 
These are interesting arguments and observations, but the critical piece of Marshall’s 
work for this study, is that he points out the inefficiency and problems associated with the 
Title 10, Title 22 laws as they relate to security cooperation.32  While this study will not 
look at potential changes to those laws or wholesale changes to defense institutions, it 
does acknowledge the fact that the current system is cumbersome and demands extra 
effort and creative solutions to fund and execute GPF security cooperation efforts. 
Another book is a 600-page analysis of the entire policy spectrum. Much of this relates to 
the security cooperation and engagement activities. Written as a PhD dissertation by 
Richard L. Kugler, Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs:  New Methods for a New 
Era, illuminates one critical aspect of the Air Force’s problem. The Air Force has 
provided the solution, or the supply side of the security cooperation equation, it must now 
inform and communicate the need for this critical tool. A key quote from the work: 
“Transformation thus is driven by both supply-side and demand-side dynamics…The 
complex challenge of matching new opportunities from the supply side to new 
imperatives from the demand side will define the multi-year agenda ahead.”33  There is 
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more analysis that can inform the discussion in Kugler’s work, but that statement is the 
root of the funding issue for the Air Force and the implementation of the MSAS.  
The final section of literature on the topic is previous theses and academic work. 
The first of these is Can Air Mobility Command Meet New Building Partnership 
Capacity Objectives? by Colonel Konrad Klausner. In this work, Klausner takes one of 
the first looks at the MSAS specifically and asks some hard questions about the funding 
issues. Klausner states, “The mine field of funding lines and legalities may distract and 
delay initial BP activities and must be aggressively addressed by HQ AMC.”34  
Klausner’s work is slightly outdated because it assumes the presence of Light Mobility 
Aircraft, originally part of the MSAS concept, but a victim of budget cuts. His 
commentary on the Title 10 and Title 22 issues along with the responsibilities of the 
various stakeholders from GCC to Headquarters Air Force (HAF) is very relevant.35  
Where this work will differ from his is the focus on that financial aspect, and a tie to 
Command Authority, which Klausner leaves out. There are additional theses, specifically 
an MSAS related thesis from Major Joe Whittington. Major Whittington’s thesis sheds 
some light on the current assessment framework used by the MSAS and some proposed 
changes from Maj. Whittington, who worked with the MSAS. Maj. Whittington’s work is 
impressive, and proved useful in gathering background information. The thesis and 
contacts made through Maj. Whittington also show the USAF’s focus on developing an 
assessment framework before really establishing how the GCCs and the Air Force will 
use the units.36  While an assessment framework for BPC is an important element of any 
effort, and Maj. Whittington’s thesis goes a long way towards developing that 
framework, the pure number of studies and effort the Air Force is directing towards 
assessment before the base issues of command and funding authorities have been worked 
out is indicative of the trend in USAF Security Assistance.  
                                                 
34 Konrad Klausner, Can Air Mobility Command Meet New Building Partnership Capacity 
Objectives?  (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 24, 2011), 13. 
35 Ibid., 13. 
36 Joseph Whittington, “Determining Mobility Support Advisory Squadron Effectiveness in Support of 
Building Partner Capacity” (Thesis: Advanced Study of Air Mobility, June 2012).  
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The key to this study is the primary source documents and interviews. Because of 
this focus on the primary sources and the relatively young concept of Air Force General 
Purpose Force Security Cooperation activities, there is little relevant literature on the 
topic. The works mentioned previously represent a quorum of relevant literature. 
Together this literature provides a good framework, fills in some details, and points the 
way to excellent primary sources. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The methodology used for this thesis is qualitative and uses two case studies, the 
modern day MSAS and the historical example of Farm Gate. These case studies are 
paired with a brief look at the 6th SOS and an overview of other current USAF BP/BPC 
efforts. The research involved in-depth interviews, observation, and small focus groups. 
The researchers considered the Delphi method as an option, but discarded it due to time 
constraints and the fact that the author considered polarized opinions of the potential 
group a barrier to consensus.37  The thesis bases conclusions on primary sources 
discovered in open source from the Department of Defense and interviews with key 
players from Farm Gate, the MSAS, the 6th SOS, and Congressional staffers. These 
interviews will provide critical insight into the processes and unpublished assumptions. 
Secondary sources mentioned previously will fill gaps in the primary documents and 
provide expert opinion. The bulk of the interviews were over the phone, although some 
discussions were held in person with the Airmen of the 571 MSAS at Travis Air Force 
Base. Their experience in standing up the unit has been invaluable. In addition, contacts 
at 12th Air Force, Air Mobility Command, and Headquarters Air Force provided insight 
from the Headquarters level as to the current direction and policy of the USAF. Some 
outside experts in Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) were on the IW Tiger Team, and gave a window to the decisions of 
the past as well as provided insight on current operations. The 12th Air Force Judge 
Advocate General’s office provided legal opinion on the status of the MSAS as it relates 
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to Title 10 vs. Title 22 authorities.38  Additionally, interviews with staff members on the 
Senate Appropriations Committee reveal the perspective of those who ultimately control 
the money the USAF should be securing for mission execution. Finally, the historical 
interviews with Farm Gate leadership are available from the Air Force Historical Office 
at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB). Classified interviews were used in redacted form to 
avoid unintentional release, and reviewed the full version to ensure accuracy of 
conclusions. Ultimately, it is both the historical and current interviews, along with the 
sources they provide, which drove the research.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis opens with an overview of the Air Force vision for Building Partner 
Capacity as reported by official Air Force publications, briefings, and official literature. 
This thesis will analyze the status of that vision based on current programs and initiatives. 
Within this section is a more in depth look at the 6th SOS and its development as a unit. 
Following the status and overview, the first case study, Farm Gate, will show what 
happens when the Air Force rushes units into the field without clear Command Authority.  
The historic aspect of this case gives perspective on the ultimate results of confusing 
Command Authorities, and how this confusion can limit effectiveness.    
Following the historical case, the case of the MSAS will be looked at more 
carefully. This case is the most current and most effective at revealing where the USAF 
falls short when developing BP/BPC capability. The planning process and initial 
assumptions will be the focus of the first section followed by a breakdown of the two 
major oversights in this process. First, the study will examine the lack of funding 
authority as a legal problem that needs correction at a HAF level in securing funding in 
the annual budget. Second, the study will focus on problems associated with confusing 
and changing Command Authority and the issues associated with the unwillingness of 
Air Mobility Command to transfer Command Authority to the GCC. Finally, the thesis 
will propose potential solutions and recommendations for a way forward on all levels, 
from the unit to the national strategy. Not only does the conclusion reveal shortfalls in the 
                                                 
38 Ojeda, “Background Paper.” 
 19 
planning process, but it also shows the extraordinary efforts of the men and women 
involved in the stand-up of the squadrons. From Farm Gate to the MSAS, the ultimate 
success of these efforts has come on the backs of the men and women who are required to 
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II. CURRENT STATE OF AMC ENGAGEMENT EFFORTS 
The USAF…must broaden its scope to include partnerships for new 
situations and circumstances. This includes expanding the scope of the 
security cooperation focus to include building the security capabilities of 
at-risk and underdeveloped partner nations. 
—2011 Air Force Global Partnership Strategy39 
The use of the word “expanding” in the quote above is indicative of the direction 
the USAF and Air Mobility Command is going with its engagement efforts. While the 
Air Force has cancelled some of the more ambitious programs due to budgetary 
constraints, the trend is clearly one of growth. Driving the massive growth of engagement 
efforts in the Air Force is a general expansion throughout the DoD. Beginning in 2006 
the national guidance begins to include verbiage that indicates increasing emphasis on 
expanding BP/BPC efforts. In 2006, the DoD released a Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) Report that stated the department must be, “prepared to grow a new team of 
leaders and operators, who are comfortable working in remote regions of the world…to 
further U.S. and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion, and quiet 
influence—rather than through military force alone.”40  This verbiage is a reaction to the 
change in thinking at the top levels of government, change that resulted from military 
difficulties with culture and engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. President Obama, in a 
the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), stated, “ Our military will continue 
strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security 
forces, and pursue military-to-military ties…”41  This is one of many national level 
documents and statements by senior administration officials which emphasizes the U.S. 
commitment to a BP/BPC strategy. Beyond the statements, the commitment of funding 
and the development of capabilities truly indicate national will behind the growth of  
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BP/BPC. The expansion and continuation of the Global Security Contingency Fund and 
other similar funds discussed later in the work is a key indicator that the change is more 
than just words.  
The other factor triggering the development of new capabilities is the push to 
include more security cooperation, specifically building partnerships and building partner 
capacity, in the general purpose force. The DoD intends this expansion to take the 
pressure off the limited numbers of Special Operations Forces (SOF) who have been 
asked to do more with the growing role in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as around the 
world in the Global War on Terror.42  As the commander of SOCOM stated, “I’d like to 
see special operations get in the business of training foreign special operations forces a 
little bit more, and in the business of training new recruits in a foreign country how to 
march in straight lines and shoot on seven-meter ranges a little bit less.”43  Because 
SOCOM wants to focus on other SOF forces, and the DoD as a whole wants to expand, 
there is a need that must be filled; the GPF is the only answer.  
In the Air Force, the response to the executive level push and the move to GPF 
security cooperation has been dramatic. This section will detail the vision for the Air 
Force engagement efforts and current programs. A broad look at the Air Force SFA 
activities allows the reader to see where the MSAS fits into the plan for AF engagement 
and why units specifically designed for SFA differ from many of the other programs. 
This broad look will give the reader a better appreciation for why the MSAS and other 
GPF units face unique challenges, and why planners must carefully consider each 
program or unit individually, rather than assuming it will operate like another established 
program or unit.  
 
                                                 




The key to understanding the USAF vision for its engagement activities is the 
term, “aviation enterprise development” (AED). When General Norton Schwartz 
chartered an irregular warfare tiger team charged with assessing the services current 
capabilities as they related to global realities, one of the key premises that the team 
operated under was that, “the security, stability, and economic development of a nation in 
the early 21
st
 century are inextricably linked to its aviation resource capacity and 
capability.”44  The team drew a direct correlation between aviation capacity and 
economic and social development. The other implication is that nations with developed 
economies and social/governmental structures are more stable and less warlike. Not only 
is this conclusion supported by the democratic peace theory, the tangible evidence of this 
has been visible over the last two decades as conflicts unfolded in third world countries. 
The U.S. Government and the USAF resolved to encourage development of these nations 
aviation industry, thereby encouraging economic and social development.45   
In the 2011 global partnership strategy document, the USAF specifically states 
that it seeks to, “play a key role in enhancing a partner nation’s independent aviation 
enterprise development.”46  The strategy goes on to lay out ends, ways, and means. It is 
here that the Air Force lists many of its programs and initiatives currently underway. The 
next section will detail some of those programs as they relate to the issue at hand, 
painting a broad picture of Air Force programs, while highlighting what sets each 
program apart as evidence that each deserves unique planning, especially when dealing 
with funding.  
B. CURRENT PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 
The Global Partnership Strategy lists 87 means that the USAF is currently using 
in its partnership strategy. The document states that the list is not exhaustive, but that it is 
a cross section of the available means. The Air Force divided those means into 11 
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categories, from Global Force Posture to Humanitarian Initiatives.47  For the purposes of 
this study, three have been selected, Partner Air Force Engagements, Education and 
Training, and U.S. Security Cooperation Personnel. Each of these means have ties to the 
selected case studies and the missions advisors are performing.  
The first category, Partner Air Force Engagements, encompasses the mission of 
both the MSAS and Farm Gate. In this category, we also find the mission of Foreign 
Internal Defense. The Farm Gate case study falls in this category and the current 
operations of a squadron known as the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) fit here as 
well. SOCOM created the 6th, based at Hurlburt Field, Florida, in the early 90’s as a 
combat aviation advisory unit. Its mission, according to the unit’s fact sheet is, “to assess, 
train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment and 
force integration.”48  The key to this unit is the fact that they will actually assist a partner 
nation’s unit in employing their capability. This is much like the role of Farm Gate in 
Vietnam. The aviation advisors of the 6th are trained to fly the aircraft of the partner 
nation, and much like the Farm Gate crews discussed later, they actually fly with and 
instruct the PN on the operation of those aircraft to include flying with the PN aviators on 
operations like counter-narcotics or counter-insurgency missions.49   
These operations, and the current national security environment with the ongoing 
war on terror, allow the use of some funding streams previously unavailable. One such 
funding stream is the 1208 funding authority, from section 1208 of the Ronald W. 
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Special operations 
forces have used this funding to provide support to foreign forces engaged in military 
operations supported by U.S. SOF to combat terrorism. As the war on terror winds down, 
the changes in funding authorities will necessitate a shuffling of how the special 
operations forces fund activities. Being in special operations command entitles the 6th to 
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authorities such as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) funding which are unique 
in Title 10 in that they authorize the training of foreign forces. Congress, in a recent 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report noted SOCOMs preference for work with 
foreign nations, also known as the “indirect approach” to SOF.50  It is a dynamic time for 
the 6th SOS with funding and roles changing. 
While the 6th has gone through a host of changes since its inception in the early 
1990s, it is instructive for the purposes of this thesis to take into account the funding and 
Command Authority issues associated with the stand-up of the squadron. According to 
Dr. Johnson stated that the Air Force funded the first 20 personnel “out of hide” when 
SOCOM refused to request money for the squadron. Lt. Col. Marvin Pugmire, in his 
Army War College thesis, “Unconventional Airman: Present and Future Roles and 
Missions For 6th SOS Combat Aviation Advisors,” referred to this as a, “rush to stand up 
a capability despite a funding dearth.”51  This rush to field before funding is a trend for 
the USAF. 
Dr. Johnson, in an interview, discussed the problems first encountered with chain 
of command issues. Dr. Johnson recalls that the squadron went from an idea in 1991 to a 
squadron in 1994. This rapid development, and the problems associated with it, highlight 
again the issues with funding and command that arise when capabilities are pushed to the 
field. With respect to command and control, Dr. Johnson indicated the issue was very 
contentious. According to Dr. Johnson in an E-mail to the author, “It was not worked out 
beforehand but was generally understood to be the Theater Special Operations Command 
(TSOC) and the Theater Commander (then CINC, now COCOM). There was some 
discussion about the relationship between the unit and the U.S. ambassador in each 
country in which the unit would operate, but the Goldwater-Nichols Act made it clear to 
us that the chain of command (OPCON as well as TACON) would be through the TSOC 
to the Theater CINC. In short, the CINC would have OPCON and the TSOC would have 
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TACON.”  He also mentions that the men of the unit took it upon themselves to work 
hand-in-hand with the country team and the Ambassador, but that they were not 
answerable to that Ambassador. This relationship makes sense, and allowing the 
COCOM to take OPCON of the unit while in country is the standard for SOCOM today, 
despite the low-density, high-demand of these units.  
In the development of the 6th SOS, another contentious issue was the funding. Dr. 
Johnson, as one of the planners who helped develop the unit, talked at length about the 
funding issue. According to Dr. Johnson, the planners knew they were going to be 
finding a variety of sources for funding, and he mentioned Title 22 and counter-drug 
authorities and funding specifically. He relates multiple occasions where it was up to the 
men of the unit to find funding such as the LATAM COOP, counter-drug funds et cetera, 
while “brokering” other units to participate in their activities. This hands-on approach 
proved useful when SOCOM actually cut funding for the unit one year. Until the Air 
Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) commander finally supported the initiative 
with his own funds, the unit was very ad-hoc. This was by design. Dr. Johnson stated in 
his e-mail that his only desire was for the Air Force to, “stay out of the way.”  He 
intentionally avoided the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process to enable the 
rapid development. Despite the problems encountered with the rush to field the 
capability, the men of the 6th SOS managed to make it work. The rush to field a 
capability is mirrored both in Farm Gate and in the MSAS. The associated problems with 
funding and command and control are not new. 
Other means discussed in the “Partner Air Force Engagements” category are 
smaller programs like conferences, visits, and engagement talks.52  Any means focused 
on improving communication and military interoperability between the U.S. and partner 
nations fall in this category. Smaller programs like this do not suffer from the same 
command and control and funding authority issues because they do not put forces on the 
ground in large numbers or involve training foreign forces. For this reason, they either 
receive Title 10 funding or have a specific budget line item. One unique aspect of this 
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category is the involvement of the National Guard. Many nations have state partnerships 
in which they maintain an ongoing relationship with National Guard units in a specific 
state. Many at SAF/IA and on the Air Staff envisage the National Guard partnerships as a 
way to maintain continuity with nations who value personal relationships. The members 
of the partner nation will see the same faces repeatedly as they are involved in multiple 
engagements. This is especially true in Africa and some Latin American nations where 
personal trust trumps everything when building a relationship.53   
The next category of means is “Education and Training.”  The USAF educates 
and trains more than 11,800 members of partner Air Forces each year. The training and 
education includes language-training, medical, command and control, security, 
maintenance, developmental and professional military education, and even flying training 
courses. It includes established programs like Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training 
(ENJJPT), which has been training fighter pilots at Shepard AFB since 1981 with funding 
taken from NATO nations.54  Another of the older programs, the Inter-American Air 
Force Academy (IAAFA) was founded in the 1940s and has existed in one form or 
another since that time. With a mission statement of, “Fostering enduring Inter-American 
engagement through education and training,” the school trains men and women from 
most air forces in the Western Hemisphere. The academy is currently located at Lackland 
AFB, Texas, and the Academy is growing rapidly with the USAF’s focus on the BP/BPC 
mission. From its earliest graduating classes of 60, the school is now producing more 
than 800 students annually.55   
Funding and command and control for programs such as IAFFA or ENJJPT are 
established by international agreement, and involve funds from many nations. The U.S. 
portion of the budget is pulled from Title 10 funds because U.S. forces are being trained. 
In addition, the maintenance of the facilities is allowable under Title 10. Command and 
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control, while subject to negotiation between participating nations is also usually 
relatively simple, with the U.S. occupying the key leadership positions and partner 
nations filling lower level leadership roles. This hierarchy is based on location of the 
program and relative financial input.56  Again, while these programs are related to the 
hands-on BP/BPC mission of the MSAS and Farm Gate, they avoid the issues associated 
with developing a capability designed to engage with partner nations’ forces in the 
GCC’s area of responsibility. 
The final category the thesis will highlight is U.S. Security Cooperation 
Personnel. This category plays a role in that it is the foundation of all U.S. security 
cooperation efforts. The document acknowledges this: “The proper development and 
utilization of USAF Airmen through a combination of education, training, and duty 
opportunities is foundational to our ongoing SC efforts.”57  The introduction of this 
section concludes with a key statement, “all aspects of the training pipeline need to be 
synchronized to ensure a steady educational development process that provides 
individuals with the required SC skills prior to reporting to the duty assignments.”       
Programs and activities in this category include attachés, the Air Advisor 
Academy, and newer programs like Language Enabled Airman Program (LEAP). The 
Air Advisor Academy is a new program designed specifically to train the airman tasked 
to be advisors in the GPF. The unit, which stood up in the summer of 2012 at Joint Basie 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst under the command of the 37th Training Wing (TRW) at 
Lackland, is developing tactics techniques and procedures for air advisors, providing 
standardized training, and is the first step in creating an air advisor. The mission of the 
Air Advisor Academy is, “to provide a rigorous, relevant, and flexible continuum of 
education and training to Airmen, so they are capable of applying their aviation expertise 
to assess, train, educate, advise, and assist partners in the development and application of 
their aviation resources to meet their national security needs, in support of U.S. National 
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Security Strategy objectives.”58  This effort to integrate training is indicative of the 
USAF’s emphasis on developing the capability and leveraging trained Airmen when 
doing so. In the case of all of these efforts, funding is secured through traditional Title 10 
sources and requires little planning outside of the normal channels, making them much 
less complicated to plan and develop. 
C. STATUS OF THE EFFORTS 
Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), General Norton Schwartz said, 
“We listen. We Evaluate. We adapt.”59  The USAF is certainly adapting. In his comments 
to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities, General Jerry P. Martinez highlighted that quote by the CSAF as 
representative of the Air Force attitude towards irregular warfare. 60 He points to changes 
as evidence of emphasis. While change in itself is not evidence of emphasis, the 
movement of money into new programs certainly shows emphasis in the military. It is in 
the movement of money that we find mixed messages. While there has been increased 
funding and development of new programs like LEAP, Air Advisor Academy, and the 
MSAS, the expensive programs that would have put U.S. Airmen in the cockpit with 
foreign partners have been cancelled. The Light Mobility Aircraft, still very much a part 
of the Air Force’s plan less than two years ago, has been cancelled.61  In addition, 
discussion of a light fixed wing attack platform such as the Super Tucano or AT-6 have 
also been delayed or discarded.62  Both of these aircraft would have been used in 
association with units like the 6th SOS or MSAS as the USAF took partners who were 
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ready into the next phase of development.  Lack of funding for these more ambitious 
programs has been cut due to budget and questions of role.   
One way to ease these budget fights would be a more universal funding stream for 
BP/BPC.  Lt. Col. Peter A. Garretson, HQ USAF, Division Chief, Irregular Warfare 
Strategy Plans and Policy, in an interview conducted by the author, stated that the USAF 
needs to take a systematic look at funding and organization in order to better direct 
efforts. According to Lt. Col Garretson, “What we need is a globally applicable, multi-
year interagency function authority to conduct non-lethal Assess-Train-Advise-(small 
Equip, small Assist) for Aviation Enterprise Development that would allow us to have 
agility and do multi-year planning—and for that authority to accept funding from other 
sources (Counter Terrorism (CT), Counterdrug, etc…like a Military Interdepartmental 
Service Request (MIPR) or a Working Capital Fund).”  Garretson goes on to explain that 
there are still questions to be answered in the structure of the USAF global SFA 
apparatus including, “What are the habitual relationships between the MSAS and…other 
units of execution that could be coordinated?,” as well as, “To what extent are MSAS 
involved in the creation of multi-decade plans for partner Aviation Enterprise 
Development?”  It has proven difficult for the USAF to allocate money to big projects, 
and provide solutions or answers to Garretson’s questions.  
These strategic questions remain unanswered despite years of executing security 
force assistance. Large unanswered questions reflect not only the rapidly changing face 
of SFA across the whole of government and the difficulty in making large-scale changes, 
but also a culture within the Air Force that has historically been able to rapidly develop a 
new capability. This rapid development relies on very capable front-line leaders and 
Airmen to handle the execution, while the top level of leadership fails to account for big 
picture items like force structure, funding authorities, and command structure. The 
programs already discussed are all tactical successes, performing their missions 
exceptionally well. Some, like the IAAFA are experiencing growing pains after years of 
establishment as the Air Force expands its SFA mission. Others, like the 6th SOS dealt 
with issues related to a rapid capability development. The rest of the work will look at 
two case studies where the Air Force did just that, fielded a very capable force relying on 
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the strength of will of both the first commanders and the confidence that issues would 
eventually work themselves out. The Farm Gate unit, while experiencing tactical success 
and executing many successful missions, was, as an advisory unit, a failure. The fate of 
the MSAS, having just reached FOC, remains to be determined. The pure uncertainty of 
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III. CASE STUDY: FARM GATE 
The Air Force has been in the business of security force assistance for decades. 
During a speech to Congress in May 1961, the President of the United States, John F. 
Kennedy stated, “The main burden of local defense against local attack, subversion, 
insurrection or guerrilla warfare must of necessity rest with local forces.”63  Despite the 
stated policy of allowing locals to bear the burden of combat, one month earlier the 
President had requested the development of counter-guerrilla forces.
64
  That directive 
would lead to the rapid development of an Air Advisor unit known as Farm Gate. In 
December 1961, those same men, deployed by the President to train the Vietnamese, 
would be flying combat missions against the Viet Cong in Southeast Asia.
65
  This unit 
continued to fly in combat for years under the name Farm Gate, Ranch Hand, and Mule 
Train.
66
  U.S. forces often conducted flights with South Vietnamese pilots to give the 
appearance of training, but according to many, the true mission was combat.
67
  Much of 
the confusion stems from a convoluted chain of command, incomplete and conflicting 
information on reporting, and the rapidly evolving situation on the ground. Unfortunately 
for the United States, military advisory activity in Southeast Asia during the early 1960’s 
is a clear case of the U.S. military attempting to help an ally in South Vietnam without 
clear foreign policy guidance or a clear chain of command. A rush to develop the unit, 
pushed from the top by men like General Curtis LeMay, led to inadequate planning for  
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how the unit would report and to whom the unit answered. The confusion and lack of 
control by the commanders in South East Asia led to the United States entering the war in 
Vietnam earlier than intended.   
A. CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
Much like the development of the Air Force’s GPF security assistance units, the 
United States developed special operators and counter-guerilla forces of the 60’s quickly 
with impetus from the top. Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum 
(NSAM)-2, which ordered development of counter-guerrilla forces, and in a trend that 
would become apparent throughout Kennedy’s presidency, Kennedy chose 
unconventional means to accomplish political objectives.
68
  Aware of the President’s 
desires, General Curtis LeMay formed Special Air War Command. As opposed to the 
popular image of LeMay as a bomber-only General, he did recognize the need to support 
Third World governments in their struggles. Not only did LeMay think this would help 
the United States win wars, he also saw it as leverage to prevent the Army from taking 
over the small-war mission with their rapidly developing helicopter force.
69
  By creating 
a capability for use in small wars, the U.S. Air Force was expanding their utility to the 
nation. Not only was LeMay looking to provide the strategic capability of the bomber, he 
was attempting to ensure that the Air Force was involved in the small wars of the future. 
Securing a role in the evolving world of security assistance is one obvious motivation for 
the Air Force developing its General Purpose Force for BPC missions. With the 2006 
NSS full of references to partner nations and the DoDI 5100.01 making building 
partnership a core function, it was up to the services to decide how to execute that 
function.70  The Air Force moved quickly to develop the BP/BPC capability in 2010, just 
as they had in 1961.  
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The first action LeMay took in his quest for small-war relevance was to create the 
4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS). The Air Force based the 4400th at 
Eglin Field, Florida in April 1961 and gave it the code name, “Jungle Jim.”71  When 
LeMay testified to Congress, he stated that the purpose was, “counter-insurgency and 
unconventional and psychological warfare operations.”72  This unconventional unit was 
given World War II era aircraft, eight T-28s, eight, B-26s, and 16 C-47s.
73
  The aircraft, 
while dated, were perfect for the technology level of the third world and effective at 
utilizing the smaller, more austere airfields found in smaller nations. This is the model 
seen in the 6th SOS today, and was the plan for the Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) and 
light fixed-wing attack platform the USAF has shown interest in during recent years.  
The confusion began when the CCTS deployed. The President specified the 
mission as training; General LeMay had other ideas. In a statement to Colonel Benjamin 
G. King, the unit’s first commander, General LeMay stated that the role was, “to conduct 
combat operations…anywhere in the world, and to be a responsive force, either overtly or 
covertly, to support United States policy.”74  The Chief of Staff made it clear that King 
was to answer to him, and all decisions would be in accordance with LeMay’s wishes. 
This was King’s first and most important chain of command, a line directly from King to 
the Chief of Staff.   
In October, the United States focused more on the development of the Vietnamese 
military and with NSAM-104, Kenney ordered, “Subject to agreement with the 
Government of Viet Nam which is now being sought, introduce the Air Force “Jungle 
Jim” squadron into Viet Nam for the initial purpose of training Vietnamese forces.”75  
With that, and without really waiting for an agreement, the 4400th CCTS deployed to 
                                                 
71 Westermann, Backseat, 128.  
72 Ibid., Quoted from Monro MacCloskey, Alert the Fifth Air Force: Counterinsurgency, 
Unconventional Warfare and Psychological Operations of the United States Air Force in Special Air 
Warfare (New York: Richards Rosen, 1969), 149. 
73 Westermann, Backseat, 128. 
74 Benjamin King, USAF Oral History Interview, September 4, 1969, Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF 
Historical Research Agency.  
75 McGeorge Bundy, NSAM-104, October 11, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library website, 
accessed August 17, 2012http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsam-jfk/nsam104.htm.  
 36 
South East Asia, ostensibly to train the South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency thereby 
aiding them in combatting the communist forces. LeMay was sure combat was the 
primary role. In fact, he stated that they went, “to fight right from the start.”76   
B. EXECUTION 
President Kennedy deployed the 4400th to serve under the Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG) as a training mission and “not for combat at the present 
time.”77 The MAAG served as Farm Gate’s second chain of command. When King and 
other officers first went to Vietnam, they also met with the Commander in Chief Pacific 
Command (CINCPAC) and the MAAG commander. During this trip, they selected 
airfields and discussed the role of the unit; the meeting with CINCPAC the mission of 
training the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) was never mentioned. Instead, the men 
discussed the ability of the unit to conduct counterinsurgency with the aircraft available.
78
  
In the meeting with the MAAG, the men discussed only the training mission. King and 
LeMay enabled this confusion because both maintained the private notion that the unit, 
now known by the code name Farm Gate, was secretly there for combat.
79
 
Compounding the confusion were the other players in country. In receiving 
targets, King recalls getting targets from LeMay, Pacific Command (PACOM), the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Ambassador, and the Vietnamese. Multiple 
military authorities claimed to have operational control over the Farm Gate unit. 
CINCPAC, MAAG, and General LeMay himself were all giving instructions directly to 
Col. King. These instructions were often conflicting, and the result was that Col. King 
was often acting in conflict with one of his superior’s wishes.80  King was ultimately 
under the impression that he worked for General LeMay, which was probably a smart 
decision but not the legal one. LeMay had formed the unit, but after formation, his role 
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should have been minimal. If the mission was truly training, the chain of command 
should have been with MAAG, but they were the most out of touch with Col. King’s true 
thoughts. MAAG’s focus was training; Col King, under the direction of General LeMay, 
had a combat focus.
81
  The final chain of command, through PACOM, was in agreement 
with LeMay. A message dated 6 December 1961 from the Vice Commander in Chief of 
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), General Moorman, described the Farm Gate mission as a, 
“covert operation,” using the “training function as a cover.” 
This is obviously an extreme example of how a confusing chain of command can 
create issues, but todays general purpose force SFA units face similar situations when 
“in-country.”  From Dr. Johnson’s description of his initial efforts in the 6th SOS, to the 
men of the MSAS today, command and control often lays outside the area in which the 
units are operating. For the 6th, it is possible that their efforts could morph into 
something like the experience of Farm Gate without proper guidance. For the MSAS, it is 
more difficult to imagine a shooting war, but the possibilities of working at odds with the 
TCP or the wishes of the COCOM are there when AMC is running command and control 
from Scott AFB rather than COCOM HQ.  
The Americans in Vietnam also had to deal directly with the wishes of the 
President. He emphasized his policy on 22 November in NSAM-111. He stated that U. S. 
was limited to advisors and minimal manning “as required.”82  The NSAM also specified 
that the military would reorganize as required to support the changing commitment. This 
was all contingent on the mass mobilization of South Vietnam, which Diem was in no 
position to accomplish politically at the time.
83
  The clarification of policy in NSAM-111 
which made advisory activity contingent on South Vietnamese action yet to be 
accomplished left the Farm Gate squadron committed to an action completely 
unsupported by national security policy. Because the military establishment was still 
entrenched in the idea of the importance of the mission, and the “foot in the door” that the 
Farm Gate men represented, the leadership did not remove the unit; all discussion 
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centered on the specifics of employment. Air Force leadership’s failure to establish a 
chain of command hindered establishment of a mission statement. The absence of that 
mission statement caused dissention amongst the military and confusion on the ground 
for the Farm Gate leadership. 
The discussion and confusion centered on whether there must be a coincidental 
training requirement. The men and of Farm Gate felt that the combat role suffered when 
putting a VNAF pilot in the rear seat due to airsickness issues and the difficulty in 
scheduling.
84
  General Lyman Lemnitzer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 
settled the dispute when he issued a directive on the afternoon of 26 December. The 
message directed the Farm Gate crews to fly with South Vietnamese in the rear seat at all 
times. This directive ended overt independent American air operations for months and 
refocused the unit on the mission of Security Force Assistance.  
The fact that King and the Farm Gate crews received and acknowledged this order 
is amazing due to the disjointed policy coming out of Washington. On 22 November, the 
JCS had recommended the creation of a separate command that would fall under 
CINCPAC. After some discussion, the solution was to dual-hat the MAAG chief as 
commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam. At that point, General McGarr, the chief of 
MAAG assumed Operational Control of the Farm Gate unit’s training mission, bringing 
it under the command of a regional commander.
85
  In an acknowledgement of the actual 
job Farm Gate was performing, Admiral Felt separated the control of Farm Gate’s still 
existing operational role and gave that to a newly formed 2d ADVON, commanded by 
Brigadier General Rollen Anthis.
86
  The 2d was another regional command established 
without consultation with the Ambassador, showing a sharp break in the policy between 
DoD and State. Farm Gate, in large part because of lack of planning, was caught in the 
middle. 
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Ambassador Nolting found it “incomprehensible” that the DoD would form a new 
command without consultation. After learning of the issue, Admiral Felt advised General 
Anthis to avoid the establishment of a new headquarters. Anthis did get the go ahead to 
conduct with the Vietnamese a, “sustained offensive, defense, and reconnaissance air 
operations aimed at the destruction or neutralization of Viet Cong forces…within the 
borders of South Vietnam.”87  The Thirteenth Air Force, with the concurrence of PACAF 
also instructed Anthis to, “Set the pattern for Vietnamese Air Force operations.”88  
According to the official Air Force history, Anthis was the de facto commander of a 
tactical air force in Vietnam in November 1961. This is in direct opposition to the stated 
intent of the President of the United States as specified in NSAM-111 and counter to the 
direction provided by the Ambassador and country teams.
89
  Acting counter to 
presidential directives is a serious risk when chains of command are not established early, 
when units operate under commands not tied to regional combatant commanders who 
have the best knowledge of the TCP, and when dealing with indigenous forces. All of 
these are factors the USAF has dealt with in its SFA forces.  
Throughout the early months of 1962, under the guidance of the 2d ADVON and 
Secretary of defense McNamara, the mission of Farm Gate evolved. The addition of 
Mule Train in January of 1962, a contingent of transport aircraft, and slow evolution of 
Ranch Hand, the much-maligned aerial spray unit, expanded U.S. operations 
exponentially. While the emphasis in Washington was still on training the RVNAF, the 
numbers tell a different story. The primary training aircraft, the T-28 flew 1794 sorties in 
the period from January to November 1962. Of those nearly 1800 flights, only 205 were 
training sorties.
90
  Clearly, in the contest between the Washington policy of training and 
Curtis LeMay’s vision of combat, LeMay was much more accurate. 
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C. FALLOUT AND CONCLUSIONS 
It was not until 1962 that the USAF clarified the chain of command for Farm 
Gate, and it was only because of a complete reorganization of the region’s command 
structure. In January 1962, the President issued NSAM-124 and formalized a group 
designed to integrate and regularize special operations in the countries of Laos, South 
Vietnam, and Thailand. While this was a bit out of order following NSAM-111, it was 
more a recognition of the fact that the mission in Vietnam was growing. The military 
took an additional step in February of 1962 with the creation of Military Assistance 
Command Vietnam (MACV) as the natural evolution of the 2d Advance Echelon 
(ADVON). MACV’s original placement was under the command of CINCPAC, and was 
supposed to encompass all of the military activities in Vietnam reporting to the JCS 
through CINCPAC.
91
  This disturbed the Ambassador and led to much consternation in 
Washington.
92
  While the Ambassador was legitimately worried that about the 
militarization of the effort in Vietnam, it was a clear signal of the administration’s push to 
allow the military more control, and a direct result of McNamara taking responsibility. 
The ultimate effect of the creation of MACV was the regularization of operations in 
Vietnam and the expansion of the Farm Gate mission under a now clear chain of 
command. 
The men of Farm Gate felt the pain of an ill-defined chain of command and 
regional policy. The lesson learned over the first months of Farm Gate was that a failure 
to plan and establish a clear chain of command caused confusion for the men on the 
ground, conflict between state and the DoD, and ultimately, according to the definitive 
study on Farm Gate, a lack of effectiveness in both the training and combat missions.93  
This lesson is especially poignant today as the U.S. struggles to define regional policy via 
country-plans, TCPs and other documents without a clear direction from the top. The 
units on the ground struggle with ill-defined chains of command, and answer to everyone 
from the Ambassador to the GCC. Air Mobility Command has created more issues for 
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the MSAS, just as LeMay did for Farm Gate by attempting to retain some level of control 
from afar. Had LeMay allowed the men in country to exercise their legitimate authority, 
the men of the CCTS and other units like it would have been integrated into the training 
mission and perhaps been more effective. The men and woman of the MSAS will not be 
starting a war, but lack of accountability can cause other very real problems for GCCs 
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IV. CASE STUDY: MOBILITY SUPPORT ADVISORY 
SQUADRONS 
This thesis dedicates the most extensive case study to the Mobility Support 
Advisory Squadrons at Travis and McGuire Air Force Base. Not only do these squadrons 
present the most current iteration of the USAF’s attempt at developing a BP/BPC 
capability, but the planning process was very transparent; the various versions of their 
concept of employment reveal how the squadrons have evolved from Tiger Team to fully 
operational. After the Tiger Team completed its work, the “Institutionalizing Building 
Partnerships into Contingency Response Forces” CONEMP formally gave the BPC 
mission to the Air Mobility command.94  AMC was quick to formalize the requirement in 
the first “Air Mobility System Building Partnerships” CONEMP. The CONEMP led 
directly to the creation of the MSAS and it is from this CONEMP that this thesis will pull 
assumptions, both stated and unstated in order to reveal the successes and failures of the 
planning process.
95
  This case study reveals that from the troops on the ground to the staff 
levels, individuals agree that the funding problem was left to the squadrons to figure out. 
In addition, some, like Lt. Col. Tom Adkins, agree that the Command Authority is 
“currently confusing and could be argued to be in the wrong place”, with the 18th AF, 
and that OPCON should be given to the Combatant Commander. These feelings are 
reminiscent of Farm Gate and the experiences of the 6th SOS, showing that the USAF 
continues to plan BP/BPC capabilities without fully considering the funding or Command 
Authority issues.  
The motivation behind the MSAS is a simple one. The aviation industry and 
requirement for aviation capacity is important not only in first world nations, but in 
developing nations as well. According to the CONEMP, “The MSAS is a deployable 
organization established to conduct BP at PN locations where air mobility operational 
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support is non-existent or insufficient.”96  This means that the MSAS will deploy to help 
partner nations increase their base operations functions such as Command and Control 
(C2), air operations, communications, aerial port, and aircraft maintenance. These 
functions set the conditions for a successful aviation enterprise. In the original concept, 
the MSAS would set the conditions for another squadron, the Mobility Assistance 
Squadron (MAS) to come and work with the PN on actual operations using the Light 
Mobility Aircraft.
97
  The LiMA has since fallen victim to budget cuts and an ill-defined 
mission.
98
  Despite the death of LiMA, the MSAS is alive and well, currently executing 
missions throughout the SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM Areas of Operations. Lt. Colonel 
Griess explained, in his interview, that the squadrons work on the base-operations 
functions of the aviation infrastructure, often advising maintainers on PN aircraft and 
local issues with fuels and communications. This builds the basis for other organizations, 
such as the 6th SOS or law enforcement agencies, to assist with foreign internal defense 
or counter-narcotic operations. It is important to note that the units accomplish 
coordination with no formal guidance or requirements. This ad hoc set-up works quite 
well in SOUTHCOM with the current personnel, but hinges on the ingenuity and 
motivation of individuals in key positions at the squadrons and at AFSOUTH, the Air 
Force component of Southern Command. In AFRICOM, the unit from McGuire (818th 
MSAS) is operating very differently, sending in small teams to engage with Partner 
Nations on specific functions one at a time. This builds on the methods in place prior to 
the development of the MSAS, with the MSAS simply providing the new pool of 
resources.99  These operations developed based on the assumptions included in the 2010 
CONEMP.  
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A. STATED ASSUMPTIONS 
This section will look briefly at the 12 stated assumptions in the 2010 CONEMP 
giving insight to the planner’s outlook when developing the capability. The first of the 
assumptions listed is: “The importance of BP and the need for coordination of its related 
activities will increase throughout the USAF and interagency.”100  While this seems 
intuitive, the assumption deserves closer attention. What will change in the world to 
make the importance of BP increase?  The United States has been engaged in some form 
of nation building and engaging with partner nations since the Spanish-American War.  A 
2009-Rand report entitled, “International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces” points to 
three factors. First, the rise of non-state, trans-national actors requires the assistance of 
multiple nations to combat the threat. Second, in an era of declining defense budgets, the 
use of capable allies is a “force multiplier.”  Finally, because the world is no longer bi-
polar, the location and nature of future threats is more difficult to predict. This 
unpredictability requires the use of many allies as a “hedge” against an unknown 
threat.101  Another, unmentioned factor is the growing importance of international 
organizations and international approval. Because recent administrations, and much of 
the world, sees the blessing of the U.N. or other regional security network such as the 
African Union or Arab League as another source of approval for U.S. military action, 
having partner nations within those regional security networks provides access and 
leverage when defending U.S. interests abroad.  
Executing those missions abroad hinges on the second part of the first 
assumption: “the importance of…coordination…will increase.”  Because the interagency 
process is complex and the types of funding authority are increasing, as the quantity of 
engagements increase, the need for coordination will also rise. At the squadron level, the 
first assumption is valid. The requirement for BPC will be increasing for the near future, 
not only because of leaderships focus, but also because of a changing international 
environment. 
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 This changing environment, according to the CONEMP, drives the second 
assumption: “International need to engage the USAF in BP-related activities will 
increase.”102  When looking at this assumption it seems to be a re-statement of the first 
assumption, but is simply looking at the same fact from the vantage point of the 
prospective partner nations. The same reduced budgets and trans-national actors combine 
with the rapid development of potential battle-space drive the need of U.S. partners. For 
the 571 MSAS at Travis AFB this need is already apparent in Honduras where the 
squadron has been executing their proof of concept mission. Lt. Col. Griess explained 
that much of the territory in Honduras is inaccessible by road, creating vast swaths only 
reachable by aircraft. The resources of narco-trafficers make this territory a potential safe 
zone if the Hondurans cannot harness aviation as a national capability. The United States, 
through DoD, Department of State (DoS), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
can provide this expertise, but without the infrastructure and basic aviation knowledge, 
the effort will fail. The USAF is the global subject-matter expert, and therefore when 
Honduras and other nations in its position want a partner, there is no better choice. 
Clearly, the second assumption concerning the USAF’s role is accurate. Both of these 
first assumptions speak to the pressure felt by USAF leadership to develop a capability 
quickly in order to fill the growing need for BP/BPC. 
The ability to balance this need for Air Force assistance with other options drives 
the third assumption, “The USAF will increasingly rely on domestic industry, and PNs to 
conduct BP in aviation areas traditionally dominated by the USAF.”103  This assumption 
points out the rise of contractors across the security spectrum. A phenomena as old as 
time, mercenaries and contractors have supported militaries for years. According to P.W. 
Singer, who wrote Corporate Warriors, a book on the rise of the paramilitary contractor, 
the United States has seen a rise in private security contractors from one in 50 members 
of the DoD during the first Gulf War, to greater than one in ten today.104  According to 
the Congressional Research Service, in 2008, there were over 160,000 private security 
                                                 
102 Air Mobility Command, Concept of Employment: 2010, 14. 
103 Air Mobility Command, Concept of  Employment:, 2010, 14. 
104 P.W. Singer. Corporate Warriors. (New York: Cornell, 2007), 277. 
 47 
contractors in Iraq alone. For a period of 3 months, there were more contractors than 
troops.105  One of the conclusions and recommendations in the Rand Report mentioned 
earlier is to employ a private contractor to execute Building Partnership engagements 
under the oversight of Air Force officers. They also point out the French already use this 
model.106  Outsourcing security is an on-going practice in the U.S. government, and with 
declining numbers, the environment will force the Air Force to utilize not only private 
institutions, but also trained partner nations to help leverage institutional expertise. The 
third assumption is correct, based on recent history and current conditions, but conflicts 
somewhat with the development of the MSAS. The MSAS is a purely active duty force; 
there are no contractors or even industry partners working with the squadrons.  
The next assumption is complicated, because one must look at both words and 
actions. The CONEMP assumes, “Improving BP proficiency is a USAF priority.”107  It is 
clear by the words, publications, and speeches from the top to the bottom of the DoD that 
the Air Force and other services are prioritizing BPC. Additionally, implementation of 
programs such as the Political Affairs-Strategist, and Regional Affairs Specialist as 
separate Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs), creation of the Language Enabled Airman 
Program to leverage Airman’s existing language capability, the Inter-American Air Force 
Academy, and the reorganization of the various Contingency Response Wings under the 
newly created Expeditionary Center show the focus the Air Force has placed on 
developing this capability.108  The MSAS is the ultimate expression of this focus and 
dedication to the creation of BP proficiency. As this work will examine later, the 
commitment of funding to these initiatives is the true measure of change. Despite 
challenges to funding the General Purpose Force BP/BPC forces, the Air Force has 
committed to the concept as an institution internally. 
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The next assumption drives the internal reorganization to GPF Security Force 
Assistance: “Air mobility is critical to success in BP.”109  In Africa Command and 
SOUTHCOM, nations where the BP/BPC mission is being executed the most; much of 
the territory is inaccessible by road. In addition, Griess shared that the threats mentioned 
earlier utilize this relatively ungoverned space to operate with impunity. Enabling the 
host nations to operate safely and effectively in this area is a proven partnership builder. 
The CONEMP lists 18 areas in which the air mobility enterprise can help a partner 
nation; everything from airdrop to weather services. The breadth and depth of experience 
that a concerted mobility effort can provide not only enables the partner nation to develop 
its own capability, it enables the United Sates to safely operate its aircraft within that 
partner nation by creating a safe global network of aviation support. This support enables 
not only the partner nation, but also the USAF’s global reach.  
The weakness of this assumption is that it is difficult to point to a successful air 
mobility building partner capacity mission in which the U.S. eventually reaped the 
benefits long term. The efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are ongoing, as is the 
development of the Strategic Airlift Wing at Papa, Hungary in support of NATO.110  The 
RANCH HAND efforts in Vietnam yielded no long-term gain, and many other efforts 
were simply too small to be effective indicators.111  The MSAS as a concept is new 
ground, so how critical it will be is yet to be determined. Based on the comprehensive 
nature of the effort, it is a good assumption that helping partners build mobility capacity 
is a critical aspect of success in BP/BPC until proven incorrect.   
Simply by the nature of the organization, the sixth assumption is a safe one: 
“AMC must be prepared to engage in BP operations globally.”112  The Rand study, 
“Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force Planning: 
An Analytic Primer,” lists conventional capacity building activities which were on-going 
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as of 2009; there were 56 nations on 6 continents listed as conducting aviation related 
capacity building activities. This stat alone validates the assumption.113  This data can be 
rolled into the next assumption that, “AMC will be involved in persistent BP 
operations.”114  Our current experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Columbia show that 
persistent engagement is not an anomaly. While many engagements involve brief 
exercises or one-time educational opportunities, the large operations require time and 
continued effort to have a significant impact on the partner nation’s capacity. When one 
looks at the timeline for MSAS activities, the timeline is years, not months.115  This 
timeline will be important when looking at funding activities. Transient authorities and 
funding tied to a specific operation may not be available for the duration of an MSA; the 
timeline demands other authorities discussed later in the work.  
Developing the capacity of other nations without sacrificing the capacity of the 
United States is the basis of assumption number nine, which reads more inspirational than 
an assumption for planning or a concept for employment: “AMC is designing its force 
structure to be “hybrid,” flexible and adaptive, expanding its non-conventional means 
without sacrificing its traditional war fighting competence.”116  This statement is tough to 
prove, but one can assume that with the modest force changes and the addition of only 
the MSASs and other minor changes to the AF force structure that any impact on the 
traditional war-fighter will be minimal. One must remember that taking experienced 
officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) out of the system, especially in 
undermanned career fields like Airfield Operations, does negatively affect readiness 
across the board. The MSAS are each authorized seven of these NCOs.117  Executing the 
traditional mission does become harder with fewer people in the traditional roles. Despite 
appearing to place minimal strain on the force, the two squadrons do strain some career 
fields.  
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The next two are also simple assumptions. First, the CONEMP states, “BP 
challenges will require tailored and scalable air mobility solutions while supporting and 
enabling PNs.”  The document goes on to say, “BP will require country-specific 
assessments of PN’s air mobility capability and capacity.”118  Both of these say that there 
is no one-size-fits-all approach to BP/BPC engagements. The variety and capabilities of 
each nation are different, and will require tailored solutions and levels of effort in order to 
achieve results going forward. What is more important to examine is who makes the 
decision about how to tailor the solution. In the current arrangement, the MSAS sends a 
team to assess the requirements of the partner nation in concert with the country team. 
The “country specific assessments” drive the “tailored and scalable air mobility 
solutions.”  This sequence is logical and natural; it should produce the correct results. If, 
however, the decisions are made by a third party not familiar with the country or region, 
the results could be reduced. This is one disadvantage of having OPCON at Scott AFB. 
With no country desks or regional specialists, the staff at Air Mobility Command is ill-
equipped to make decisions about the actions of a team in country. These assumptions 
support giving OPCON to the GCC.  
Conducting any step of the process requires trained personnel. The 11th 
assumption is, “BP will require trained Air Mobility Airmen to advise PN air 
components.”119  While Rand suggested that there is the potential for contractors led by 
an Air Force officer, a set-up like that does not maximize the partnership building 
opportunity. Having only one or two uniforms on the ground in a partner nation limits the 
amount of relationships built and reduces the trust in the U.S. military when compared to 
a team of U.S. service members. Following a 2005 earthquake in Pakistan:  “A spring 
2006 Global Attitudes survey found that the vast majority of Pakistanis were aware of 
American relief efforts—85% said they had heard about post-earthquake aid—and views 
of the U.S. improved modestly, with 27% of Pakistanis giving the U.S. a positive rating, 




up from 23% the previous year.”120  An American engaging with locals and helping 
where possible improves attitudes. While the long-term impact is still worthy of study, it 
is safe to assume that having a uniform on the ground helps improve the attitude of the 
locals and builds trust.  
The final assumption deserves discussion only in that it implies a need, but fails to 
direct action later: “C2 capabilities to plan, execute, and access operations are essential to 
success in BP.”121  This statement simply implies that there must be an apparatus in place 
to manage all aspects of the BPC mission. The CONEMP, in section 3.1, states that 
instructions for Command and Control are located in the Air Mobility Command 
Instruction (AMCI) 10–202 series. Upon further inspection, there is no reference to either 
the MSAS or building partner capacity122. This implies that the Air Force is treating the 
MSAS as it treats each of its units, as a platform. This thesis will discuss the implications 
of this and relationship to C2 in detail later. This final assumption, although true, brings 
into focus some requirements that may be lacking.  
B. UNSTATED ASSUMPTION 1: FUNDING AUTHORITIES 
With direction from the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the USAF developed a 
capability designed to build partnership and build partner capacity.123  The previously 
mentioned assumptions were relatively simple and dealt with the international 
environment as it relates to BP/BPC. What appears to be missing is a proper analysis of 
the funding and sourcing for the MSAS mission. Consider the BP/BPC mission as a 
supply and demand equation. The Air Force trained and equipped the MSAS, providing 
the supply, but there must be a demand for the capability and funding for execution. In 
most cases, the Air Force builds a capability, pays for training and equipping that  
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capability via Title 10 Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. When the capability is 
needed, other Title 10 money funds execution, either through Overseas Contingency 
Operation (OCO) funds in a wartime environment, or through other established Title 10 
funding sources during peacetime. This cannot be the case for building partnership 
missions. Because there are specific rules for employment of Title 10 funding, which 
precludes use on training or equipping foreign nations, the traditional methods of funding 
USAF capabilities or platforms do not apply.124  The Air Force needs to plan not only the 
training and equipping of the unit, but define the funding required for execution. It is not 
the responsibility of the USAF to secure the funding directly from the DoD Comptroller, 
but ensuring the demand from GCCs and the ability of the GCC to secure the funding is 
essential. Without the demand, there is no reason to create the capability.   
In the CONEMP, the authors showed that little thought had gone into funding 
authority for execution:  
“The authority and appropriations for military forces to perform BP and 
BPC varies by PN, the type of activities being performed and the forces 
involved, the missions being performed, the yearly defense appropriations 
acts, and other variables. Given this complex array of authorities, GCC 
and component planners should seek Financial Management and legal 
coordination early to ensure legal and fiscal authority exists to execute the 
BP or BPC missions.” 125   
While completely true, this paragraph simply states that it is complex to fund 
these engagement activities and that funding should be assured prior to execution; it reads 
as more of a warning than a concept of employment. The lack of specifics is primarily 
because the funding responsibility falls not on the capability provider, AMC, but on the 
GCC or other requesting authority. The joint force, through the service components, 
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purposes, Title 10 O&M is not an option for engagement. In the past, there have been 
established methods of funding aviation engagement activities like the 6th SOS. With the 
expansion of the GPF security assistance mission, there have been new sources of 
funding added. In particular, Section 1206 of the Defense Authorization Act, known as 
the Global Contingency Fund is designed to be used by either the special operations 
forces or the GPF when conducting security assistance, and provides the DoD and DoS a 
way of combining funding to utilize the manpower of the GPF in security assistance.126   
There is concern on the Congressional level that the Defense Department is not 
using the fund correctly and that the DoD has not specifically defined the roles of both 
the SOF and the GPF when utilizing this funding and conducting security assistance. In 
accordance with the House Armed Services report on H.R. 4310, the 2013 Defense 
Authorization Act, the Comptroller is required to submit, within 180 days, a report that 
details the methods by which the DoD proposes to delineate the roles of both SOF and 
GPF when conducting SA.127  In a telephone interview with Mr. Andy Vanlandingham, a 
long-time Senate staffer, on December 20, 2012, he noted the going concern is that the 
“bureaucracy of the DoD and DoS makes prioritizing and requesting funds from 1206 or 
1207 authorities a very cumbersome process.”  Vanlandingham stated that that in any 
given meeting concerning the funding, the Senate would send 3–5 people and the DoD 
and DoS would each send 15, each person with a different stake in the process. In many 
cases, the list of priorities from DoS and DoD were completely different. This complex 
bureaucratic process to secure funding, with the complex nature of the rules governing 
use of funding, prevents implementation.  
At the squadron level, the complexity becomes apparent. Interviews with both the 
Travis and McGuire squadron commanders reveal similar issues, but vastly different 
solutions and specific challenges. For the Travis unit, dedicated to SOUTHCOM, Griess  
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stated that the demand signal is strong, and the unit has a full schedule and the ability to 
put large teams into any one of many countries. The challenge is finding specific 
authorities to allow the engagement. For the 818th out of Joint Base McGuire-Dix-
Lakehurst, Lt. Col. Thomas Adkins explains that the culture in Africa in a driving factor 
for the GCC’s preferred method of engagement to utilize small teams of two to four 
individuals.  While there have been established Title 22 authorities for this type of 
activity via programs like Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT), 
the challenge has been integrating the MSAS into the program.  In addition, selling the 
MSAS as a viable capability has been more of a challenge for the 818th due to less 
history of large scale engagement efforts in Africa like Latin America and South America 
have seen, e.g. Project Colombia.128  After speaking with the leadership of the two 
squadrons, it is hard to see them as part of the same capability because of the vastly 
different challenges and operating environments. What quickly becomes clear is that lack 
of established funding authorities has increased the challenges of both squadrons 
exponentially. What also becomes apparent is that lack of planning forced them to 
develop ways to execute their missions, train their Airmen, and engage in their area of 
responsibility, often without guidance or support from AMC or the GCC. This lack of 
guidance, and failure to identify funding led to potential repercussions.  
At the GCC level, the 12th AF (AFSOUTH) Judge Advocate General (JAG) has 
voiced his opinion in a bullet background paper that points out the unit was potentially in 
violation of the Anti-Deficiency Action Act during an early engagement.129  In his 
interview, Griess described a recent engagement activity, defined by the unit as a “proof 
of concept” mission, the 571 MSAS from Travis engaged with the Honduran Air Force. 
Considered by all to be a successful mission, the Air Force provided some measurable 
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Maintenance (MX) procedures, and C2. When reporting the success of the mission, the 
unit was careful to phrase all impact to the Hondurans as ancillary to the training of the 
MSAS members. The JAG noticed the parsing of words, and his assessment is that the 
semantics do not change the fact that the MSAS is using Title 10 money to train foreign 
military, despite the mission requirement of the MSAS to “train the trainers.”130  While 
the MSAS may have skirted the law in development, they reached FOC in December 
2012, and the use of Title 10 money became tougher to justify. The authors of the 
CONEMP left the burden of finding authorities to the men and women of the squadron 
and current staff at the various commands. Both squadrons have found different 
authorities that work for them, but the solution is not the same for both units. The 
complicated nature of the funding authorities assured lack of planning. Despite multiple 
Tiger Team recommendations that dealt with funding, including, “Align efforts to 
streamline legal authorities to accomplish BP missions with OSD and Joint Staff 
initiatives.” the Air Force has failed to accomplish this, and the MSAS continues to 
cobble together authorities for individual engagements.131  In addition, the Tiger Team 
noted on numerous occasions that desk officers and others who went to work in staff 
positions responsible for engagement had little to no training on funding authorities.132  
This lack of training limits support from above and adds to the pressure on the units to 
find their own funding. The cumulative effect is increased responsibility on the men and 
women of the MSAS.  
C. UNSTATED ASSUMPTION 2: COMMAND AUTHORITIES 
Complicating the life of Airmen in the MSAS is confusing Command Authorities. 
In the original CONEMP, the MSAS was to transfer Command Authority to the 
Geographic Combatant Commander. This “CHOP” is the way a unit operating within a 
GCC usually operates, with one key exception; the Air Mobility Command considers 
most of its assets “national assets.”  In the national asset model, the ability to move 
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platforms, like air refueling aircraft and strategic airlift platforms, from GCC to GCC 
helps AMC prioritize and allocate resources amongst various regions. Moving men and 
materiel between regions as required by the “customers;” in this case, AMC maintains 
important flexibility. With the exception of a few airlift and tanker aircraft permanently 
assigned to PACOM and European Command (EUCOM), as well as some airlift 
temporarily CHOPed to CENTCOM, there are no GCC owned AMC assets. Even at 
PACOM Air Force bases like Kadena Air Base, there is an AMC control center alongside 
the PACOM base operations to assist these AMC assets as they traverse the globe.133  
The IW Tiger Team noted, “AMC is organized primarily for conventional warfare—
major movements to main ports with hub-and-spoke distribution to forward locations.”134  
When the planners created the CONEMP for the MSAS, they assumed that AMC would 
abandon the national asset model in favor of a more traditional TOA, thus avoiding many 
confusing command and control issues. As the unit reached initial operating capacity, and 
received their orders, they learned they would not be CHOPing to the GCC, but would 
still fall under AMC, and 18th AF control. In an e-mail to the author, a subject matter 
expert at AMC, Mr. Deo Lachman, agreed that Air Mobility Command based the 
decision to retain C2 on the national asset model used on aircraft. Because the MSAS 
units are “scarce resources” and the Air Force integrated the squadrons within the 
Contingency Response Groups (CRGs), also controlled by AMC, it made sense to 
manage them the same way.
135
  Retaining command and control of the MSAS while in 
country has the potential to create confusion and multiple sources of direction for the men 
and women on the ground executing the advisory mission. The confusion created by 
operating under the control of an entity not designed for regional control has been 
experienced before; it degrades unity of effort, creates lack of accountability, and runs the 
risk of straying from regional and national policy due to lack of guidance.  
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The historical precedent lies in Farm Gate. No one questioned Farm Gate’s 
effectiveness at the time. Perhaps this was due to the lack of a defined mission, or maybe 
the inability of anyone to take actual responsibility for success or failure prevented an 
assessment. With orders coming from three sources, the Commander, Colonel King, 
could have done nearly anything without repercussion. If something went wrong, there 
was no authority (other than perhaps General LeMay) to be held accountable. In addition, 
no oversight guided the actions of the unit towards national or regional policy. This 
failure to attach the unit to a coherent regional policy produced results that echo today in 
the disjointed efforts at foreign assistance. The Theater Campaign Plan is supposed to 
unite the military efforts under one plan in coordination with the efforts of the State 
Department.136  The inability of the GCC to obtain Command and Control over all units 
operating within his region is a clear disadvantage to the execution of that TCP.  
In the most recent iteration of the CONEMP, the “assessment phase” emphasizes 
working with the other entities on the ground, stating, “The team should also review the 
DoS (U.S. Embassy) Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP) for the PN. What are the 
GCC and air component/NAF goals, objectives, end state for the PN?  What capabilities 
does the PN have?  What are the gaps the PN should fill?  What is the required level of 
U.S. assistance/training/advising?  Initial assessments should focus on PN’s ability to 
employ the Air Mobility System (AMS) to achieve national strategic goal.”137  This is the 
correct focus, but if the GCC requested the capability, there should already be direction 
provided on the regional and national level objectives. Below is the notional timeline 
from the 2012 CONEMP.  
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Figure 1.  Timeline for MSAS Activities138 
What is missing in today’s reality is that the GCCs are not requesting, nor are they 
securing funds. This leaves AMC with no real incentive to CHOP to GCC control, and it 
leaves no one accountable if the mission fails. The creators of the timeline do not show 
the “review phase” where a Partner Nation completes an exercise or inspection the 
advisors measure them against previous performance. The unit conducts the review and 
forwards to the AFSOUTH staff and AMC, but there is no formal process defined for any 
higher-level review.139  A lack of higher review compounds the lack of accountability. 
With AMC responsible for the unit, and the GCC responsible for results, there is a 
dichotomy of responsibility. Much like the AFSOUTH JAG, most of the critiques offered 
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wrong. At the end of the day, personal responsibility by a flag officer is required for 
mission success. The MSAS does not have that individual responsibility.  A Transfer of 
Authority to the GCC could place that responsibility where it belongs, with the command 
executing the Theater Campaign Plan and responsible for the relationship with Partner 














“We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other 
nations peacefully—not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, 
but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear.” 
—President Barak Obama140 
President Obama’s 2013 inaugural address provides the preference of the nation 
for conflict resolution; this preference extends to the military as well. At first glance, the 
Air Force seems to suffer from a poor planning when developing squadrons specifically 
designed to build partnership or build partner capacity. This has been evidenced through 
Farm Gate, the 6th SOS, and the Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons. The Air Force 
has repeatedly ignored funding issues and delayed decisions about command and control 
until the unit is in the field. While this has created problems for the men and women in 
the units in the form of confusion and extra work, the lack of planning has generally 
resulted in units flexible enough to find unique funding, and with the notable exception of 
Farm Gate, units that ultimately report to correct authorities.  
A. ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 
The first major issue the USAF continually fails to adequately plan is the ultimate 
Command Authority for its BP/BPC units. As far back as Farm Gate, the confusion 
caused by this issue left men like Colonel King reporting to many masters from the 
geographic commander to the chief of staff. E.B. Westermann, in his article “Relegated 
to the Backseat,” exposed the results of this mixed message, ineffective training and a 
resultant poor performance from the Vietnamese Air Force.141  As the 6th SOS stood-up, 
Dr. Johnson, in his e-mail, discussed how various commands embraced or distanced 
themselves from the concept. Ultimately, when the unit became operational, Dr. Johnson 
says he “told everyone what they were doing,” in order to avoid conflict. Dr. Johnson 
involved everyone from USSOCOM to AFSOC to the Embassy. While this worked for 
                                                 
140 Barak Obama, Inaugural Address (Washington, DC, January 2013). 
141 Westermann, Backseat, 62. 
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reporting, the planning process had not defined ultimate authority for TACON. Dr. 
Johnson states that it was “understood” that the unit would be under the OPCON of the 
GCC and TACON would be with the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). The 
Goldwater-Nichols act, clarified the relationship with the Embassy since Farm Gate, but 
confusion still existed. Finally, today’s MSAS concept has changed from Transfer of 
Authority to the GCC to maintaining control at Scott. Experts at AMC like Mr. Deo 
Lachman agreed with the author; the rationalization for this is the same national asset 
model that the command uses for its aircraft. The men and women in the MSAS are, like 
those in the 6th and Farm Gate before them, making it work. They report to AMC and 
work closely with the GCC. With the GCC driving the demand, it creates some extra 
work. As the current Director of Operations at the 571
st
 MSAS, Lt. Col. Gabriel Griess 
explained, “there are some really smart people at AFSOUTH who do a lot of our 
planning for us and coordinate with other assets like the 6th.”  The units execute this 
planning ad hoc because the lack of authority in the GCC fails to institutionalize the 
process and separates accountability for the TCP and units performing the missions.  
The solution to this problem is clear, from the planning process through full 
operational capacity; the USAF must plan hereafter to TOA BP/BPC units to the GCC. 
This Operational Control by the GCC creates buy-in on all levels and fully integrates the 
units into the TCP. TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command do not have the same 
structural elements as USSOCOM, but both commands are global and support not only 
national objectives, but integrate on a daily basis into GCCs and support theater 
campaign plan objectives. The MSAS is a specialized capability that deserves the full 
attention and control of theater commander in which they execute their mission. While 
the concept seems to be working at the outset, the work required by the 818th to integrate 
his men into programs such as ADAPT show the detachment from GCCs at the 
beginning. In addition, the vastly different methods of employing the MSAS capability in 
SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM show that the units require theater expertise in 
employment. Just as the results of Farm Gate and the testimony of Dr. Johnson regarding 
the 6th SOS have shown, the MSAS and future BP/BPC capabilities need to TOA in 
order to maximize effectiveness. 
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The second apparent failure of planning BP/BPC capability limiting units’ 
effectiveness is the lack of designated funding authority from the moment of stand-up. 
While Farm Gate suffered no such issues due to the direct involvement of General 
LeMay, the 6th SOS was constantly under threat of funding loss. The first iteration of the 
MSAS concept of employment stated that the variety and sources of funding for BP/BPC 
is “complex” and that great consideration should be given to funding each 
engagement.142  While this is certainly the case, those who developed the capability 
abdicated their responsibility to give guidance on what funding was available. The 
planners left it to the leadership of the new squadron. As little as three months before 
reaching FOC, the members of the 571
st
 MSAS were happy to have “found” GPOI and 
1206 options for funding.143  These options were there from the beginning, but planners 
left it to Airmen in the squadron to learn the resources available in federal code.  
It works. Despite the challenges, the units, especially the 6th SOS, and more 
recently the Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons have been able to utilize their 
capability with great impact. As individuals buy-in to the concept and push the message 
at headquarters and GCC staffs, those staffs address the problems on increasingly higher 
levels. What is truly needed, as mentioned in an interview by Lt. Col. Peter Garretson, 
Division Chief, Irregular Warfare Strategy Plans and Policy, is a, “globally applicable, 
multi-year interagency function authority to conduct non-lethal Assess-Train-Advise-
(small Equip, small Assist) for Aviation Enterprise Development that would allow us to 
have agility and do multi-year planning—and for that authority to accept funding from 
other sources (CT, Counterdrug, etc…like MIPR or a Working Capital Fund).” Garretson 
describes his office as the advocate for the MSAS at the Headquarters Air Force level. It 
is clear that there has been some progress built by the leadership of the MSAS and their 
advocates, but Garretson points to systemic flaws that makes obtaining funding difficult. 
There is no fund dedicated to the mission of SFA by General Purpose Forces.  
Senate staffers agree with Garretson’s perspective. Mr. Andy Vanlandingham, a 
long-time staffer on the Senate Appropriations committee recalls briefings on 1207 
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143 The author witnessed this on a visit to the 571
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 in July, 2012.  
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funding that involved 30 or more members of DoD and DoS where each department had 
different ideas for the use of the money. The current system is cumbersome and full of 
bureaucracy. The Air Force, if it plans to continue the lead role in Aviation Enterprise 
Development, must develop a strategy to mold legislation that creates a globally 
applicable fund like Garretson describes. A fund like this would benefit all of the services 
and each service should accept the change. The problem, as described by 
Vanlandingham, is the protection of “rice bowls.”  The units who currently execute SFA 
like Special Operations and those operating under GPOI have a desire to maintain the 
status-quo. Because creation of a general fund would require reduction or elimination of 
other authorities, organizations operating under those funds resist changes. While this 
resistance is a challenge, of the dozens of individuals on all levels interviewed for this 
thesis, each spoke only of the benefits of such a fund.  
B. CONCLUSION 
As the United States shifts emphasis from defeating enemies on the battlefield to 
preventing wars through engagement, the Air Force will develop more Building 
Partnership and Building Partner Capacity capabilities. In order to utilize these new 
capabilities correctly there are a complex set of legal conditions and funding authorities 
that that the GCC and the Air Force must plan and execute in concert. The Air Force, 
responsible for the supply side of the Security Assistance equation, did an outstanding job 
training and equipping the Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons, Farm Gate, and other 
units like the 6th SOS in a short amount of time. In each case, they failed to plan 
important pieces of the capability adequately. Planners left either funding or command 
and control out of the capability development in each case. This failure to plan has left 
much of the work to the men and women on the squadron level, who are seeking out 
funding authorities and scheduling engagements themselves rather than relying on the 
staff elements who are usually assigned to these roles. These men and women have 
performed admirably. From Farm Gate to the MSAS, the leaders of these squadrons have 
found a way to get the mission done.  
 65 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research has been limited by time available in the course of study and 
institutional review requirements for interviews of subjects. A proper Delphi study 
focusing on the planning process of BP/BPC capabilities within both the USAF and other 
services would likely expose deeper causes of the failure to plan funding authorities and 
reasons for changes in Command Authority. Such research would require time and 
interviews of senior leadership of all services involved in the planning process. In 
addition, a more extensive study focusing solely on the Mobility Support Advisory 
Squadrons and the planning process used to create these squadrons using a Delphi 
method, may support conclusions found herein.  
Historical research on the effects of the Farm Gate unit from the perspective of 
the Vietnamese would provide more insight as to the success of the U.S. BP/BPC efforts. 
While Westermann’s work does a great job of looking at the effects from an American 
perspective, a work that incorporated his look with interviews of Vietnamese trainees and 
leaders would truly be comprehensive. In addition, an in-depth historical look at the 
development of the 6th SOS with interviews of many of those responsible for developing 
the squadron, including key leaders such as General McPeak should be accomplished 
soon before the age and time clouds memories.  
These historic works can provide the case studies and education for future Air 
Force staffers as the trend towards partnership continues. As the countries of Latin 
America and Africa continue to develop aviation enterprise, it is critical to engage with 
them in this development. Both technical assistance and the personal connections made 
while advising nations not only aids in access for mobility assets in peacetime and 
combat assets when needed, but also creates a framework for other governmental and 
military connections. This framework should be controlled and directed by the 
Geographic Combatant Commanders, and funded through a universal General Purpose 
Force SFA funding authority.  
 66 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 67 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adkins, Thomas. “MSAS...You Didn’t Even Know AMC Does Building Partner 
Capacity, Did You?”  2012 Airlift Tanker Association Presentation, Anaheim: 
CA, 2 Feb 2012. 
Arteaga, Ken. “Air Advisor Education & Training Information Brief.” San Antonio TX: 
Headquarters Air Education and Training Command, November 2009. 
Bundy, McGeorge. NSAM-2. February 3, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
website, accessed August 17, 2012, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-
Viewer/B3leMaWRSkOnvMDbjd00Cw.aspx. 
Chapuran, Robert C. “Bullet Background Paper on Mobility Support Advisory Squadron 
(MSAS),” Washington, DC, February 23, 2012. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency. “Frequently Asked Questions.”  (n.d.). 
http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/faq.htm.  
———. “Warsaw Initiative Fund.”  (n.d.). http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/faq.htm.  
Department of Defense. Department of Defense Directive (DoD) 5100.1 Functions of the 
Department of Defense, and Its Major Components. Washington, DC: Office of 
the Secretary Of Defense, 2008. 
———. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary 
Of Defense, February 2006. 
———. Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report. Washington, DC: Office of the 
Secretary Of Defense, January 2009. 
———. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. 
Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary Of Defense, January 2012. 
———. The National Military Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: Office of 
the Secretary of Defense 2006. 
Department of State. “Global Peace Operations Initiative: State-DoD Partnership.” (n.d.). 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/c47008.htm.  
Donley, Michael and Norton Schwartz. 2011 U.S. Air Force Global Partnership 
Strategy. Washington, DC: HQ USAF, 2011.  
 
 68 
US Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. “US  Special Operations 
Forces (SOF):  Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew J. Feikert. CRS 
Report R41817. Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, 6 February, 2013. 
Futrell, Robert. The Advisory Years to 1965. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force 
History, 1981.  
Gates, Robert M. Department of Defense Directive 5100.01: Functions of the Department 
of Defense and Its Major Components. Washington D.C: Department of Defense, 
21 December 2010. 
Johnson, Wray. “Ends Versus Means: The 6th Special Operations Squadron and the 
Icarus Syndrome,” Air & Space Power Chronicles - Chronicles Online Journal, 
January 12, 2000. (n.p.).  
———. Whither Foreign Internal Defense, Airpower Journal, Spring 1997, 66–86. 
Kee, Randy. “Bridging the Gulf Between Theater and Strategic Air Mobility.” Master’s 
thesis, Advanced Study of Air Mobility, 1996. 
Kennedy, John F. “Historic Speeches.” Special Message to the Congress on Urgent 
National Needs (speech given to a joint session of Congress, Washington, and 
D.C:  May 25, 1961). John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.   
Kennedy, John F. Papers. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Library and Museum.  
King, Benjamin. USAF Oral History Interview, September 4, 1969. Maxwell AFB, AL: 
USAF  Historical Research Agency.  
Klausner, Konrad. Can Air Mobility Command Meet New Building Partnership Capacity 
Objectives?  Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 24, 2011. 
Kugler, Richard. Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs:  New Methods for a New 
Era. Washington DC: National Defense University, 2006. 
LeMay, Curtis. USAF Oral History Interview, June 8, 1972. Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF 
Historical Research Agency. 
Linstone, Harold A. and Murray Turoff. The Delphi Method: Techniques and 
Applications. London: AddisonWesley, 1975. 
US Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Building the Capacity of 
Partner States Through Security Force Assistance, by Thomas K. Livingston. 
CRS Report R41817. Washington DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, May 5, 2011.  
 69 
MacCloskey, Monro. Alert the Fifth Air Force: Counterinsurgency, Unconventional 
Warfare and Psychological Operations of the United States Air Force in Special 
Air Warfare. New York: Richards Rosen, 1969. 
Marshall, Jeffery. Skin in the Game: Partnership in Establishing and Maintaining Global 
Security and Stability. Los Gatos, CA: Smashbooks, 2011. 
Maolda, Edward, and Oscar Fitzgerald. The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict. 
Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 
Mesic, Richard, David E. Thaler, David Ochmanek, and Leon Goodson. Courses of 
Action  for Enhancing U.S. Air Force “Irregular Warfare” Capabilities: A 
Functional Solutions Analysis. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG913. 
Moroney, Jennifer D. P., Kim Cragin, Eric Stephen Gons, Beth Grill, John E. Peters, and 
Rachel M. Swanger. International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces. Santa 
Monica, CA:  RAND Corporation, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG790. 
Moroney, Jennifer D. P., Joe Hogler, Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, and Stephanie Pezard. 
Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force 
Planning: An Analytic Primer. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR974.  
Moroney, Jennifer D. P., Celeste Gventer, Stephanie Pezard, and Laurence Smallman. 
Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries: The 
Cases of Australia, France, and the United Kingdom. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2011. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR972. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Strategic Airlift Capability. (n.d.). 
http://www.nspa.nato.int/en/organization/NAMP/sac.htm. 
Newman, John M. JFK and Vietnam. New York: Warner Books, 1992. 
Obama, Barak. “Inaugural Address,” Washington, DC January 2013. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Plans. Theater Campaign Planning: Planners 
Handbook. Washington D.C: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2012. 
Ojeda, Omar. “Bullet Background Paper on Funding Challenges of Mobility Support 
Advisory Squadron Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Engagements in 
SOUTHCOM AOR.” AFSOUTH/JA: Davis Monthan AFB, NM, 2012. 
Pugmire, Marvin. “Unconventional Airman: Present and Future Roles and Missions For 
6th SOS Combat Aviation Advisors.” Master’s thesis, Army War College, 2000. 
 70 
US Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Department of Defense 
Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis, by Moshe 
Schwartz. CRS Report R40764. Washington DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, 2010.  
Singer, P.W. Corporate Warriors. New York: Cornell, 2007. 
Sorenson, Ted. Kennedy: The Classic Biography. New York: Harper Collins, 2009. 
U.S. Air Force. “6th Special Operation Squadron: Factsheet.”  (n.d.) 
http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3496.  
———. “Air Force Program Learns from Airmen.” 7 May 2010, 
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123203518. 
———. “Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training: Factsheet.” (n.d.). 
http://www.sheppard.af.mil/library/factsheetspage/factsheet.asp?fsID=5168. 
———. Institutionalizing Building Partnerships into Contingency Response Forces. 
Washington, DC: The Department of the Air Force, April 2010. 
———. Irregular Warfare Tiger Team Observations and Recommendations. 
Washington, DC: The Department of the Air Force, May 2009.  
United States Air Force Financial Management and Comptroller. “FY13 Department of 
Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 President’s Budget Submission: Volume 1,” 
Washington D.C: Headquarters Air Force, Feb 2012. 
U. S. Air Mobility Command A8XP. “Building Partnership Forces (BPF) Timeline 
Update,” briefing slide, Scott AFB, IL, HQ Air Mobility Command, August 2010. 
U. S. Air Mobility Command. Air Mobility System Building Partnerships Concept of 
Employment: 2010. Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, 2010. 
———.  Air Mobility System Building Partnerships Concept of Employment: 2012. Scott 
AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, 2012. 
———. Expeditionary Air Mobility Support Operations, Air Mobility Command 
Instruction 10–202 Volume 4. Scott AFB IL: U.S. Air Mobility Command, 
December 2009. 
———. “Tanker Airlift Control Center: Factsheet.” (n.d.) 
http://www.618tacc.amc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=13564.  
U. S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Vol. I. 
Washington, DC: www.hisotry.state.gov.  
 71 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doctrine for Joint Operations. Joint Pub 1. Washington, DC: 
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 September, 2001. 
———. Doctrine for Joint Operations. Joint Pub 3–0. Washington, DC:  Office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2001. 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7. Joint Capability Areas: JCA 2010 Refinement. Washington 
DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 8, 2011. 
Westermann, E. B. “Relegated to the Backseat,” in Military Advising and Assistance, ed. 
Donald Stoker. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: White 
House, March  2006. 
———. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: White House, 
May 2010. 
Whittington, Joseph. Determining Mobility Support Advisory Squadron Effectiveness in 
Support of Building Partner Capacity. Air Force Institute of Technology: Wright 
Patterson AFB, OH, June 2012.  
Wike, Richard. “Does Humanitarian Aid Improve America’s Image?” Washington, DC: 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 73 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
